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This thesis examines the stance of the DLP and the factors that led the DLP 
to the top of the Turkish political scene in the 18 April 1999 elections. While 
the DLP’s stance is explained with a new kind of ideological position that 
can be termed  ‘center-left nationalism’, the rise of the DLP in the elections 
is mostly explained by the conjuncture of the pre-election period. The study 
also examines the history and structure of the DLP, and the corruption in 
Turkish politics. 
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Özet 
 
 
 
DSP’Yİ YENİDEN DÜŞÜNMEK:  
1999 SEÇİM KAMPANYASI ANALİZİ 
 
 
 
Hale Doğan 
 
Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü 
 
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Ergun Özbudun 
 
 
 
Eylül 2001 
 
 
Bu tez 18 Nisan 1999 seçimlerinde DSP’yi ve DSP’yi Türkiye siyasetinin zirvesine 
taşıyan nedenleri inceliyor. DSP’nin duruşu ‘milliyetçi merkez sol’ olarak 
nitelendirilirken, DSP’nin seçimlerdeki yükselişi daha çok seçim öncesi ülke 
gündemiyle açıklanıyor. Bu çalışma DSP’nin tarihini, yapısını ve Türk siyasetindeki 
yolsuzluğu da anlatmaktadır.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Turkish electorates’ great tendency on trying the ‘untried’ in the elections 
was rectified in the elections of 18th April 1999. However, the outcome of the 
elections was highly interesting to work on, which depicted a leftist party and an 
ultra-nationalist party as winners. Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit’s party 
(Democratic Left Party - DLP) won a clear plurality of the popular vote with 
more than 22 percent and 136 seats in the 550-seat parliament. The Nationalist 
Movement Party (NAP) , a traditionally small, ultra-nationalist party that never 
previously won more than 8 percent in a national election finished as second 
with 18 percent and 129 seats. 
 The major common feature in two parties was that their votes stood as a 
token of rising nationalism in the country. Not only the capture of the PKK 
leader, Abdullah Öcalan, but also rejection by Europe fueled nationalism. 
Besides both parties’ emphasis on nationalism, being untainted by corruption and 
being honest were important qualities for the voters, as they were outraged by 
the numerous allegations of corruption, swirling around Tansu Çiller and Mesut 
Yılmaz. former prime ministers of the center-right.  
This thesis is an attempt to rethink the DLP on the basis of its rise in the 
1999 elections. The  DLP’s center-left nationalist stance in the elections was an 
outcome of a political strife that had begun under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit 
through the adoption of the ‘left-of center’ slogan beginning from the mid 1960s. 
In the first chapter, I will try to redraw the political history of both Ecevit and the 
DLP. Every step that brought Ecevit to his current line of thought will be studied 
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in a detailed fashion. The thesis will also examine the differences of the DLP’s 
‘Left’ from the other leftist parties and movements under the context that covers 
Ecevit’s departure from the RPP until today. The political structure of the DLP, 
which carries serious deficiencies in terms of democracy and leftism, will also be 
analyzed.  
The second chapter studies the political conjuncture of Turkey, under the 
headings of the closure of the Welfare Party led coalition with the True Path 
Party, the Susurluk Scandal and the capture of Abdullah Öcalan. In this context, 
it is deduced that the riding tide of nationalism provided the proper basis for the 
revitalization of the ‘leftist-nationalism’ of the DLP. Ecevit, who is the 
‘conqueror of Cyprus’ and the mythical ‘Karaoglan’ of the 1970s has turned out 
to be the ‘conqueror of Kenya’ after the capture of Öcalan. Ecevit’s effect on 
people’s regaining belief in the ‘national honor’ and his honest, moderate and 
conciliatory character as opposed to the corruption of the center-right politicians, 
are my main arguments in explaining the rise of the DLP in the 1999 elections.   
My thesis will cover the election platform and campaign of the DLP in 
the third chapter. The other parties’ election pamphlets, election campaigns and 
their discourses will also be examined. I will argue that DLP’s discourse has 
shifted from the left to the right and this seems to validate the ‘center’ element of 
the ‘center-left-nationalist’ concept used for defining DLP.  The support of the 
army, the state and the several sections of the media to the DLP during the pre-
election period and its aftermath are also depicted as factors that portrayed a 
‘center party’ image for the DLP. 
My thesis will mostly be based on data taken from the print and the 
audio-visual media, as it is a descriptive study. The rise and the political 
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structure of the DLP will be presented from various angles to provide the reader 
to re-position the DLP in the Turkish political spectrum. 
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One of the main arguments of this thesis is that the conjuncture of the 
pre-election period carried the DLP to the top of Turkish Political scene. The 
corruption that came to be identified with the politicians and politics and the 
capture of Abdullah Öcalan were the major phenomena that put their stamp on 
Turkey’s agenda while entering the 18 April 1999 elections. 
While the Susurluk scandal will be covered as the disclosure of the 
corruption in the state and bureaucracy, the dissolution of the Welfare- True Path 
government and the 28th February process will also be analyzed as the catalyst of 
this dissolution. This thesis will also depict how the military and the DLP came 
closer, because DLP was loyal to the ideals of Turkish Republic and because it 
was uncorrupted. The capture of Öcalan and Ecevit’s sensitivity on preserving 
the delicate balance between the army and the state and his relation with the 
media in this process will be covered. 
 
Welfare-Path∗ & Susurluk Scandal 
In September 1995, then Prime Minister Tansu Çiller announced that she 
was ending her party’s three-year coalition with the Republican Peoples Party 
and requested President Süleyman Demirel to dissolve the parliament and call 
for new elections. The focal point of the elections was to reshape the direction of 
the economy. Çiller’s True Path Party and Mesut Yılmaz’s Motherland Party, 
                                                          
∗ Refahyol 
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situated as center-right parties, were for preserving and building upon the 
economic reforms first initiated by Turgut Özal1. The Repuplican People’s Party 
of Deniz Baykal and Democartic Left Party of Bülent Ecevit, both vowed to 
suspend privatization and renegotiate the newly made customs-union agreement 
with the European Union. The Welfare Party of Necmettin Erbakan, standing 
apart from both the center-right and center-left, demanded a greater voice for 
Islam in the country. 
 The disunity of the center-right and left led to the rise of Welfare Party 
out of the 1995 elections. Welfare won 21% of the popular vote and 157 seats in 
the parliament. Motherland and True Path each won about 19.5% of the vote, 
with True Path winning 135 seats to Motherland’s 133. The Democratic Left 
Party emerged fourth with 14% votes and 76 seats while Republican People’s 
Party ended up with 50 seats and 10% of the votes. 
 As a leader of the largest party in parliament, Erbakan was given the first 
opportunity to form a government. However, he could not manage to form a 
government and after several negotiations had taken place, a coalition 
government was established under the prime ministry of Yılmaz, with Çiller.  
The Motherland-True Path government, however, was to prove short-lived. As 
soon as the new government had been set up, Erbakan began to call for an 
investigation on Çiller. Çiller was in trouble with the Tedaş and Tofaş 
corporations as they had been privatized for less than their real value under the 
1993-5 tenure of Çiller as Prime Minister.  
 With any such investigation expected to take up to two years and with 
Turkish law prohibiting the accession to the prime ministry of a party leader 
                                                          
1 The founder of the Motherland Party and the Prime Minister of Turkey during the 1980s. 
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under investigation, Tansu Çiller found herself trapped.  Yılmaz voted in favor 
of the investigations and the “Mother-Path” coalition was at the beginning of its 
end. Yet there was still more to come. What finally ended the coalition was 
Yılmaz’s announcement in May of 1996 that Çiller, in her final days, as Prime 
Minister, had withdrawn more than six million dollars from the Prime Minister’s 
discretionary fund without informing anyone of how the money had been spent. 
She insisted on not telling for what the money was spent and her reason was 
“national security” interests, which prevented her from making such a disclosure. 
 In such a critical position, Çiller opened up negotiations with the one 
person who did not demand that she explain where she spent the money: the 
Welfare leader Erbakan. After a series of secret meetings, Çiller and Erbakan 
announced in early July that they were forming a government with Erbakan as 
Prime Minister. Not surprisingly, one of the Welfare-True Path government’s 
first issues was to suspend the Tedaş-Tofaş privatization inquiries. A motion to 
set up a committee investigating Çiller’s discretionary fund scandal was also 
voted down, as was a motion to investigate Welfare on the issue of gathering 
money for Bosnians that had later disappeared. Erbakan had finally found 
someone to join him in government and let him be Prime Minister, and Çiller 
had found a way to stay in government and out of court.2 
 
                                                          
2  James H., Meyer “Politics as usual: Çiller, Refah and Susurluk: Turkey’s troubled 
democracy”  East Eurepean Quarterly,  Jan99, Vol. 32 Issue 4, p489, 14p 
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The Susurluk Scandal 
The scandal revealed ties between the state, the police and the Mafia. The 
accident stands as the central point of the corruption network in Turkey. Nothing 
could have been worse than to find one of the MPs with a Mafia member in a car 
crash. The protest of people to the Susurluk scandal can be depicted as the first 
steps in the search for  ‘an honest’ politician and untainted government in the 
1999 elections. If we look at the scandal in a more detailed fashion; 
  At the beginning the Susurluk scandal seemed to be only a mundane 
traffic accident. In November of 1996, just outside the town of Susurluk, located 
about one hundred miles southeast of Istanbul, an Ankara registered Mercedes 
pulled out of a gas station and was hit by an oncoming track. Three of the 
Mercedes’ four passengers died in the accident.3   
 What stimulated so much interest in this accident was the identity of the 
Mercedes’ passengers. Surviving the crash was Sedat Bucak, a member of 
parliament from Tansu Çiller’s True Path Party and a representative from Urfa. 
Riding with Bucak and killed in the accident was Hüseyin Kocadağ, in an elite 
government anti-terrorist team called the Special Operations Department, as well 
as a gentleman named Mehmet Özbay and his girlfriend, a woman named Gonca 
Us. 
 Within hours of the crash, however, it was discovered that Özbay was in 
fact Abdullah Çatlı, a right-wing gunman from Turkey’s “time of troubles” in the 
1970s. Furthermore, at the time of the accident in Susurluk, Interpol wanted Çatlı 
for his 1982 escape from a Swiss prison, where he had been held for drug 
                                                          
3 Veli Özdemir, (ed), Susurluk Belgeleri , (İstanbul: Scala Yayıncılık, 1997) pp. 229-354 
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trafficking. Perhaps most shocking of all, the car in which Catlı, Bucak and 
Kocadağ had been riding was found to have been carrying a collection of 22-
calibre Beretta pistols fitted with silencers and two MP-5 automatic rifles, all of 
which were subsequently found to have been the property of the Ministry of the 
Interior. 
 In the police investigation following the accident, it was learned that Catlı 
had been issued “privileged” class passports in the name of Mehmet Özbay, 
having been signed by Mehmet Ağar, the Interior Minister member of True Path 
Party. Why had Ağar, who resigned from his post ten days after the scandal but 
who continued to sit in parliament, given a known criminal wanted by Interpol 
false passports? Why had a member of the parliament and a former police 
official had been riding in the same car with Çatlı? Why was the car loaded with 
weapons and silencers? Both Ağar and Bucak, as they are members of 
parliament, were protected by parliamentary immunity and therefore could not 
be prosecuted in a court of law. In their testimony to the parliamentary 
commission investigating the scandal, however, both man asserted their 
innocence without delving too far into details. Bucak’s testimony, often self-
contradictory, related the story of how Çatlı - though Bucak claimed to have 
known him only as Mehmet Özbay- had been a causal acquaintance of his and 
that their being in the same car had been the result of an innocent coincidence. 
As for the weapons in the trunk, Bucak vowed that he had no knowledge of 
them, but speculated that they had been planted in the car after the accident. 
Ağar, for his part, cited reasons for national security in refusing to answer 
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questions regarding his relationship with Çatlı. Efforts to have the immunity of 
Ağar and Bucak to be lifted were stopped by the Welfare-True Path coalition.4  
 And who exactly, was Abdullah Çatlı? In the 1970s, when violence 
between rightist and leftists reached epidemic proportions, Çatlı was a leader of 
the gray wolves, a loosely-knit right-wing nationalist organization. The gray 
wolves were thought to have had ties to the nationalist politician Alparslan 
Turkeş and have been held responsible for many of the murders of the time. 
Çatlı, in particular is believed to have played a role in the “Bahcelievler 
Massacre” in 1979, in which rightists in Ankara gunned down several leftist 
students.  
 
Susurluk Protests 
It was in this dense atmosphere that the protests of February of 1996 began. 
Starting at nine o’clock in the evening of February first, a campaign called “one 
minute of darkness for perpetual light” came into being. The protest soon 
evolved into flashing lights, blaring car horns, and the sound of women banging 
pots and pans together on their balconies. During February, these protests grew 
larger. It was seen in the western part of the country in the beginning and then in 
the eastern parts. Throughout March, the protests were called off. When the 
report of a parliamentary commission investigating the scandal released on April 
2  even failed to recommend lifting of parliamentary immunity for Bucak and 
Ağar, the nine o’clock protests continued for a week or two. But then faded out 
completely by the end of April as attention shifted to parliamentary attempts to 
unseat the government. 
                                                          
4 Turkish Daily News (TDN), June, 1997 
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The Closure of the Welfare Party 
 May 1996 brought increased pressure from the military, the guardian of 
Turkey’s democratic secular structures on Welfare to resign. This culminated in 
a spectacular series of conferences organized by the National Security Council, 
which was taken as crucial warnings to the Welfare Party. Stating that “Turkey is 
facing an extremely serious threat”, General Fevzi Türkeri, chief of military 
intelligence, went onto say that political Islam is “working closely with Iran and 
some other Islamic countries to pull Turkey into an endless darkness.” Deputy 
chief of staff, General Çevik Bir, meanwhile, asserted that the military had a 
constitutional duty to protect the country’s secular principles. “We are acting 
strictly in accordance with the Turkish constitution,” said General Bir. Article 
Two of the constitution declares that we are a secular country, and article four 
says that this provision can never be changed.”5  
  While the army was trying to take the power into its own hands, there 
were also serious reactions from the businessmen and media against the 
government and general corruption in the country. A number of secular 
individuals and civic groups began to confront the Islamic movement where it 
has made the greatest gains: as patrons of social services and defenders of 
democracy. Turkey’s powerful industrial groups were openly alarmed by 
Erbakan’s populist policies and Islamic thrust. Rahmi Koc, head of the Turkey’s 
largest conglomerate, engaged in a public war of words with the Erbakan 
                                                          
5 Marvine Howe, Turkey Today: A Nation Divided Over Islam’s Revival. (USA: Westview Press, 
2000), 124. 
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government, warning that the private sector had no choice but to take the matters 
into its own hands.6 
 Early in 1997, the influential Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s 
association (TUSİAD) issued a soul searching analysis on what had gone wrong 
in the Turkish Republic. Viewing the Islamists’ electoral victories as a protest 
against the system, TUSİAD urged the elimination of certain deficiencies in 
Turkish democracy. The 200-page report calls for the freedom of religion, 
thought and expression... Even more daring, the report suggests eliminating the 
National Security Council, the organ through which the armed forces can 
intervene in any aspect of government policy. These apparently reasonable 
recommendations caused plitical uproar, however, president of TUSİAD, Halis 
Komili, was called to task by the military and subsequently resigned. Rahmi Koç 
and other prominent businessman took their distances from the revolutionary 
report. 7 As Howe asserts,  
“The Turkish media took up the ball. Initially the mainstream press and 
television stations had been willing to give a chance to Erbakan-Çiller 
tandem. But as the government stalled over the Susurluk scandal and 
high-profile crimes, the media was increasingly thrust into the position 
of the political opposition. Revelation followed revelation about slick 
racketeers, shady businessmen, criminal gangs, drug lords, and gunman 
with links to the state security services.”8 
                                                          
6 ibid, 125 
7 ibid, 128 
7 ibid, 130 
8 “Military Shadow on Turkish Media: ‘Andıc’ Case As A Turnusol Paper”, a paper written by 
me for the Turkish Politics course, January 8, 2001 
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At the 28 February 1997 meeting of the NSC, the commanders urged 
members of the council to recommend the necessary measures and implied that 
otherwise the military would be obliged to deal with the threat, themselves. 
Deputy Prime Minister Çiller attempted to defend the coalition government by 
saying that religion could not be used for political purposes, because she and her 
colleagues in her party stood guard of secularism. The commanders responded 
by pointing out that they did so only in words but not in deeds and gave some 
examples. As compared to Çiller, Erbakan was more soft-spoken. He did not 
challenge the commanders; he only requested that the councils’ 
recommendations should be expressed in general terms, adding that otherwise he 
would have problems in explaining them to his rank and file. The meeting ended 
by the NSC’s eighteen recommendations to the government. Among those, the 
NSC wanted to see pupils attending a secular school for eight years before 
studying at Imam Hatip schools.9 
 The government did not act in the way the commanders wanted. In order 
to put more pressure on the coalition government, on May 26 the commanders 
held an extraordinary meeting of the Supreme Military Council and dismissed a 
number of commissioned and noncommissioned officers on the grounds that 
they had sympathies for political Islam. At this point, Demirel told journalists 
that he had requested Karadayı10 that the military should refrain from making 
public statements. On January 10, the general staff gave still another set of 
briefings to the judiciary and the academia, then to the media, and finally to the 
                                                          
 
 
10 The Chief of the General Staff 
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business groups in order to mobilize the public in the hope that Welfare-Path 
would respond. 
Erbakan gave his resignation in order to change posts with Çiller, 
however the President surprised them by appointing Mesut Yılmaz, as prime 
minister, despite the fact that Çiller and Erbakan together commanded a majority 
in parliament at the time. A new coalition comprising the Motherland Party, the 
Democratic Left Party, and the Democratic Turkey Party was to be 
establishedThis was a coalition of secularly oriented parties. Still, the 
commanders stated that they would continue to monitor the developments in he 
problem of political Islam.11  
On 16 January 1998, the constitutional court dissolved Welfare, on the 
grounds that it had attempted to establish a state based on Islam. The court used 
as evidence some of the statements of Erbakan and four others, including 
İbrahim Halil Çelik, Hasan Hüseyin Ceylan, and Şevki Yılmaz, who were 
banned from active politics for five years.12  
 In the period from the1995 elections to the closure of the WP, which also 
included the Susurluk scandal, Turkish electorate has suffered from their leaders’ 
inability to provide solutions to their various economic problems and from a 
political system that was becoming inherently unstable. This intricate structure 
established between the state, police and the mafia resulted in the loss of 
credibility of the politicians in the eyes of the public. Resolving the problems by 
                                                          
11 When Çiller formed the coalition government with the WP on 27 June 1996, 14 of Çiller’s 
backbenchers stayed away, abstained, or voted against the coalition. On 16 July, eight of them 
formally broke away from the TPP to form the Democratic Turkey Party (DTP) under 
Husamettin Cindoruk. 
 
12 ibid 
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extra-parliamentary groups, moreover, played important role in the decreasing 
support to the parliamentarians. 
 The decisions made at the National Security Council’s (NSC) meeting of 
February 28, 1997 clearly indicated that not only Welfare-Path but also all future 
Turkish governments would have to observe. The situation was such that Mesut 
Yılmaz, who assumed the prime ministry in the ANAP-DSP-DTP (Motherland 
Party-Democratic Left Party-Democratic Turkey Party) coalition government on 
condition of accepting the “NSC program” clashed with the military several 
times because of the weaknesses in the implementation of the program. A 
discussion of its basic tenets was out of question. During this period, there was a 
sharp rise in the army’s tendency to formulate the country’s domestic and 
foreign policies before the civilian government 
 Again during this period, besides the closure of the Welfare Party, 
Istanbul Mayor Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a young, dynamic and charismatic leader 
of political Islam in Turkey, was tried and punished for a poem he had read and 
took his place among the politically exiled.  The Virtue Party that was founded 
after the closure of the Welfare party depicted what would be the boundaries of 
an Islamic party in the new era. In other words political Islam was taught the 
perimeters of harmless and legitimate political activity. 
 
The Capture of Abdullah Öcalan  
 
 While reckoning with political Islam continued, certain fundamental 
changes were initiated on the Kurdish issue, which is Turkey’s most important 
problem. As Gül Demir indicated, “The gangs established within the state 
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apparatus, the children of the special war against separatist terrorism that were 
given the opportunities and support to grow to grotesque proportions, were not 
liquidated, but pacified to an important extent.” 13 
The most important improvement in the terrorism realm was in Abdullah 
Öcalan ’s case, the leader of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), who has been 
staging a separatist terror campaign in southeastern Turkey since 1984, was 
forced to leave Syria, where he had lived for 20 years. There was an incessant 
campaign of pressure with the active and direct aid of Turkey’s allies geared 
toward preventing the PKK leader from finding refuge in any of the countries to 
where he fled.14 
 The collapse of Mesut Yılmaz’s government and the maneuvers to 
establish a new government led by Bülent Ecevit, the deputy prime minister, 
took place at this point. On December 2, President Süleyman Demirel asked 
Ecevit to form Turkey’s new government. His two attempts to form a 
government with the Republican peoples Party of Deniz Baykal failed. Thus, 
veteran politician Bülent Ecevit gave up forming a new government after failing 
to gather enough support from the pro-secular parties in parliament. President 
Demirel asked independent deputy and Minister of Industry and Trade, Yalım 
Erez, to form the new government on December 22. While these attempts were 
taking place on the one hand, on the other hand a vote of no confidence toppled 
the minority coalition government of Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz on 
corruption charges. At this point Tansu Çiller played her card and proposed a 
minority government under the tenure of Ecevit, which her party was ready to 
back. As follows, Demirel asked Ecevit to try to form a coalition in a second 
                                                          
13 Gül Demir, “Puppet Play On the Election Stage,” TDN, March 17, 1999,10. 
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attempt during Turkey’s six-week-long government crises. Finally, President 
Demirel approved the Democratic Left Party (DLP) minority government list 
prepared by Prime Minister Ecevit, on January 11 1999. Thus, DLP chairman 
Ecevit, whose party emerged from the 1995 elections only in fourth place, found 
the opportunity to establish a government that received a vote of confidence in 
Parliament, where the DLP was represented with only 59 delegates. From this 
time on, the debates on postponing the elections that would be held in April 18 
did not end. It was at this point, on February 17, that the leader of the outlawed 
PKK, Öcalan, was captured in Nairobi, Kenya, handed over to Turkish security 
teams and returned to Turkey. In the protest against his capture by Turkish 
special forces, Öcalan ’s guerillas and other shadowy far leftist sympathetic to 
his cause started a campaign of urban violence that  killed more than 20 civilians. 
A dozen died on March 13, when unidentified attackers threw a incendiary bomb 
into a crowded store in Istanbul. As the victims were being buried, the PKK 
announced that the whole Turkey would become a war-zone.  
 In such  kind of an atmosphere, some 120 members of parliament who 
had been struck off their parties’ lists of candidates for the upcoming elections 
called a session of parliament in an attempt to postpone the voting. On March 
16th, the “disgruntled” or “mavericks” signed a censure motion against Ecevit’s 
minority government, hoping to bring it down. They got the backing not only of 
the center-left Republican People’s Party, which was afraid it would not get the 
10%of the vote needed to win any seats at all, but more unexpectedly, of the 
Virtue Party.  It seemed odd for the Virtue Party to want to delay the elections, 
since opinion polls gave them a chance more than anyone else (22% of the votes, 
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a bit more than they got in the 1995 election). Their aim was to try to get 
Necmettin Erbakan back into politics.15 These attempts to postpone the elections, 
however, did not change the election date. 
 If we look at Öcalan ’s capture story in a more detailed fashion; 
 After he was expelled from Syria, Abdullah Öcalan turned out be a headache for  
so many European countries. He fled to Italy from Russia and then a myriad 
problems of occurred between Italy and Turkey. Turkey wanted Öcalan 
extradited on charges of murder and terrorism, but Italy  refused on the grounds 
that Turkey had the death penalty - as the Italian constitution bars extradition to 
countries that practice capital punishment. The dispute sparked widespread anti-
Italian protests in Turkey.  
 Öcalan was also wanted in Germany, but German officials said they 
wouldn’t seek his extradition for fear of unrest among Germany's 2.7 million 
Turks and Kurds. Öcalan had applied for political asylum in Italy and indicated, 
via his lawyers, that he would be willing to face trial by an international court.  
The German and Italian governments agreed to work together to bring Öcalan 
before some sort of European or international court.  
Meanwhile, the protests against Italy turned out to be trade-war between 
the countries. Moreover, the EU expressed full solidarity with Italy’s 
determination to abide by its constitution, which bars extradition to any country 
that has the death penalty. Crowds in Ankara continued a sixth day of protests 
outside the Italian embassy on Saturday where they shouted anti-Italian slogans.  
 A Rome court lifted restrictions on Öcalan, leaving him free to leave the 
country on December 16th, however on Dec. 23, Italian Prime Minister Massimo 
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D’Alema said for the first time that Abdullah Öcalan was likely to be expelled 
from Italy.16  
Thus, none of the governments dared give him shelter. So Öcalan 
continued his quest to find a place of refuge, but failed as soon as the doors in 
Europe closed one by one, and he was left with Greece that tried to give him 
asylum, but failed. As they knew that Öcalan ’s existence in Greece would anger 
Turkey, they made him fly to Nairobi. Despite the denial of Kenyan officials for 
the refuge of Öcalan, he was kept in the Greek Embassy of Nairobi.  At this 
point the story of Öcalan ’s capture begins. As it follows, 
The National Intelligence Organization  (MIT) learned about Öcalan ’s 
presence in Kenya on Feb. 4. And immediately sent a special team to 
Kenya. It was determined that Öcalan was at the Greek Embassy in 
Nairobi. On the same day a summit meeting was held in Ankara and a 
decision was made to capture him with an operation the moment he left 
the embassy. To capture Öcalan  10-strong team of the General Staff’s 
Special Operations Department was sent to Kenya in a plane belonging 
to businessman Cavit Çağlar. Gen. Engin Alan directed the operation 
from Ankara. On the Feb. 15, Öcalan left the Greek Embassy, in the 
evening with the special team following the convoy, captured Apo and 
brought him to the special plane waiting at the airport. 17 
At last, the 16-year long war that killed more than 30,000 
people, including soldiers, guerrillas and civilians (even babies and 
teachers) in the southeast ended by the capture of Öcalan. This war 
prevented the region’s development in economic and social terms as 
well. The per capita income was less than half the national average. The 
area was also deficient in health care, education, housing, and water 
provision. 18 
  
This success, which was a climax for the country, was achieved under the 
Prime Ministry of Bülent Ecevit, who had announced the Cyprus intervention to 
save the Turkish Cypriots from Greek militants 25 years ago. And he was back 
                                                          
16 http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_218000/218469.stm#top 
17 TDN, January 4, 1999 
18 Hürriyet, February 18, 1999 
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in the seat again delighting Turks with the good news. His announcement in the 
full-text was: 
Esteemed correspondents, I have an announcement to make to you and our 
dear citizens: Abdullah Öcalan , leader of the separatist terrorist 
organization PKK is in Turkey as of 0300 [0100 gmt] this morning.  
We had always said that our state would capture him wherever he may be. 
We kept our promise. The promise given to the mothers of the martyrs has 
been kept.  
Abdullah Öcalan , who has been shut out of every place in the world, 
found himself in the arms of Turkey in the end. He will be accountable by 
the independent Turkish judiciary for his actions and for what he forced 
others to do.  
It is time for everybody to realize that separatist terrorism will not lead 
anywhere in Turkey and that nobody can defeat our state.  
Appeal to PKK supporters  
This morning, I would like to appeal in particular to the young who fell 
into the traps set by Apo [Abdullah Öcalan ], his men, and his supporters.  
I would like to appeal to all the young people who hide in mountains and 
caves, who commit acts of self-immolation, and who inflict great pain on 
our mothers, fathers and all our nation: He who proclaimed himself as 
leader was living comfortably in luxurious mansions while you, for years, 
were being used as instruments of murder and were living in utter misery 
in mountains and caves.  
His collaborators, in turn, were also leading prosperous lives in certain 
European countries.  
Surrender to the justice of the state  
I am appealing to all the young people who fell into those traps: You have 
reached a dead end. Surrender to the justice of the state.  
Undoubtedly, our nation will then enable you to take advantage of the law 
of repentance. Come reunite with your mothers and fathers after a long 
separation and satisfy your longings.  
Use your strength to develop the people together with the state and not to 
murder innocent people. Say to all those who misused you, who threw you 
into the fire, and who provoked you to stage hunger strikes and commit 
suicide: 'Enough'.  
The intense and silent pursuit  
Before ending my address, I would like give some brief information on 
how Öcalan  was captured. I cannot go into the details; however, I can say 
with certainty that Öcalan  was captured without anybody's getting hurt, 
including him.  
He was captured in the wake of an intense and silent pursuit, which we 
carried out in various countries on various continents. Only 10 officials 
were aware of this operation. There were no leaks. The operation would 
have failed had there been the slightest leak.  
This operation was a success as a result of the harmonious work carried out 
by our General Staff and the MIT [National Intelligence Organization].  
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I congratulate them and extend them my appreciation. A difficult feat was 
achieved. The rest is up to the jurisdiction of our independent judiciary. 
Let God protect our nation and all humanity from terrorism and wars. 19 
 
 
Therefore, it would not be so difficult for one to guess the undeniable 
affect on the electorate of the capture of Abdullah Öcalan under the tenure of 
Bülent Ecevit as  prime minister of the minority government,. Although the story 
of capture stayed as a state secret and several rumors had been manufactured on 
Turkey’s minimal role in the capture, it was sufficient for most of the people to 
hear the final step from Ecevit. This relief turned out to be a remedy or the 
offended  ‘national honor’ of theTurkish people. This riding tide of nationalism 
not only strengthened the nationalist feature of the DLP but also revitalized the 
Karaoğlan myth. In essence Ecevit set out as the ‘conqueror of Cyprus’ in 1974 
finished as ‘conqueror of Kenya’ in 1998. 
 People’s demand for an honest and uncorrupted politician increased also 
after the Susurluk scandal. In regard to this fact, the conjuncture depicted Ecevit 
as a major option. The features of this option in the party and leader level will be 
analyzed in the next chapter. 
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Politics is not hundred meters run, 
but a marathon..” 
Bülent Ecevit 
 
 
 
The long roadrunner, Bülent Ecevit, has been a prominent actor in 
Turkish political life about 50 years. It is really hard to differentiate to what 
extent Turkish politics has been shaped by Ecevit’s attitudes or vice versa. The 
deficiencies of Turkish democracy reflect upon Ecevit’s understanding of 
democracy. For instance, our democracy had been intervened for four times in 
order to rescue democracy and this echoes back in Ecevit as; on the one hand, he 
presents himself as the ‘guardian of democracy’ and on the other hand he is 
infamous for his party’s lack of intra-party democracy. 
Always dressed in a sky blue shirt, Ecevit brought peace and hope to the 
Turkish political scene in the unstable administration of the National Front 
government of the late 1970s. He was in office during the ‘Cyprus Peace 
Operation’ and during the ‘Capture of Abdullah Öcalan’. However, his black 
hat∗, which was also identified with him, reflected its darkness on the political 
structure of Turkey approaching the 1980s.  Yet, it is also an undeniable fact that 
he is one of the most charismatic leaders of Turkish political history as he 
attracted the millions with his ‘honesty’ and ‘modesty’ as well.  
         Turkey, being a country of instabilities, uncertainties and inconsistencies, 
has served as a ground for a silent and innocuous man to convert himself into a 
vanguard of Turkish politics. It is also true that Ecevit has created his own 
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opportunities in most cases. He is now the Prime Minister of the Turkish 
Republic at the end of a long and painful marathon. Analyzing the political 
history of Ecevit, his leadership and the DLP from its foundation period until the 
18 April 1999 elections will be an attempt to re-define the DLP and its position 
in the 18 April 1999 elections. 
 
History of Ecevit’s Political Life 
Ecevit was involved in both writing and politics when he began to swork 
at Ulus newspaper that had close links with the RPP, in 1952. As a Robert 
College graduate, Ecevit  translated Associate Press news into Turkish. In the 
meantime, his concern in the political issues increased and he began to write 
on politics in Ulus. So, until he became the secretary-general of the RPP in 
1966, the party and Ulus served as a ‘school of politics” for him. Taking 
advantage of a scholarship he went to the United States twice. The first one 
was a three-month study at Winston-Salem Journal in the autumn of 1954 
and the second was a one-year seminar on journalism at Harvard University 
in 1957. After staying eight months in the USA, he returned to Turkey. His 
return was due to the approaching elections, in fact; he was not away from 
the political atmosphere of Turkey during his days in America and through 
sending essays to Ulus he kept his link with Turkey. Ecevit benefited from 
the advantages of his acquaintances in journalism in his political life. 
Without doubt the journalists are the ones who make and take criticisms at 
the highest level, so he used the art of criticism perfectly in his political life. 
                                                                                                                                                            
∗ It can be seen in the Appendix 3. 
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Moreover, declaring his own views in a well-organized and effective way is 
also a result of his experience in journalism. 20 
 So, as soon as he came back to Turkey he found himself in the political 
arena. He was nominated as a candidate in the 1957 elections. He was elected 
as deputy and served as a MP and as prime minister during the 1970s, except 
for a period after the 1980 military intervention. 
 Ecevit took place in the Founding Parliament (Kurucu Meclis) after the 
27 May 1960 coup as one of the architects of the new constitution. Although 
Ecevit was against the regulations of the Democratic Party (DP) before the 
1960 period, he criticized the approval of the death sentence given to Adnan 
Menderes that would be carried out in Yassıada. Ecevit was severely 
criticized not only because of his anti-execution political view of the 
executions, but also for his support of İnönü in giving the political rights 
back to  DP members.  
 Ecevit was appointed to the Ministry of Labor, in the coalition 
government of RPP and JP (Justice Party) established after the 1961 
elections. He was 36 years old and one of the youngest ministers of the 
parliament. Workers’ rights to make collective agreements and their rights to 
strike were legalized during his ministry. 
The 1965 election results were a disaster for the RPP. This failure was a 
result of the steady decline after the RPP’s stance with the 27 May 1960 
military intervention. It was also related with the ‘left-of-center’ policy 
adopted before the elections. The voters did not understand this new ‘left-of-
                                                          
20 Orhan Koloğlu, Ecevit ile CHP: Bir Ask ve Nefret Öyküsü (Ankara: Büke Yayıncılık, 2000), 
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center’ slogan nor did they like it. However, there were supporters of the idea 
that, the left-of-center policy was not sufficiently explained to the people. 
İnönü’s defense of the left-of-center was: “The shift to the left was obvious 
in the country. So, the justification of the left-of-center policy is to hinder 
this shift. I will insist on this policy, as it is necessary... The left of center 
stands as a dividing wall both for the ultra-left and ultra-right.” Ecevit was 
also among the believers in the veracity of the policy.21  
Ecevit was elected to the office of secretary general in the 18th Congress 
of the RPP in 24 October 1966. He declared his faith in the left -of-center 
policy in his speech at the party congress. Ecevit’s resolute posture did not 
show any deviation even after the failure of the RPP in the 12 October 1969 
elections. The RPP received 27.4 per cent of the votes while the JP garnered 
46.6 percent of the votes. 
 The gradually rising student revolts and murders that brought the country 
to the threshold of a civil war ended with the military interruption. The 
Memorandum of 12 March 1971 was an intervention in democracy for 
Ecevit. The Memorandum served as a turnstile paper that uncovered every 
one’s color in the party. It was in the way that, some even favored not to hold 
elections for the following several years, and on the other hand, some 
depicted 12 March, as an intervention to the leftist movements. 
 The RPP adopted a stance supporting military intervention. When İnönü 
accepted to be in the government, which would be established by the military 
under the prime ministry of Nihat Erim, Ecevit could not endure  this process 
and resigned from the office of secretary general. Koloğlu indicates the basis 
                                                          
21 Bila Hikmet, CHP 1919-19998, (Istanbul:Dogan Kitapcilik, 1999), 219. 
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of Ecevit’s resignation as; the RPP was mostly criticized on the point that the 
party had come into power by the support of the military since the 27 May 
1960 intervention. The failures of 1965 and 1969 were also evaluated in the 
same framework. Ecevit believed that letting the military’s shadow reflect on 
the party would mean to mortgage the future of the RPP. It would also 
increase the ongoing criticisms on the left-of-the center policy.22  His own 
explanation was: “I can not admit RPP’s coming to power in extra-
parliamentary ways even it is disguised as the peoples’ will.” 23 Ecevit 
interpreted the ‘above-parties government’ in the same context with the 
memorandum as both were interventions to the constantly strengthening left-
of–the center movement. After his resignation, the executions of Deniz 
Geçmis, Yusuf Aslan and Hüseyin İnan were ratified in the parliament. 
Ecevit, who has always been against execution made a speech as a defense, 
in that he put the blame not on the accused, but rather on the ‘power’s’ that 
guided them. So, here we should acknowledge that Ecevit’s negative stance 
to the executions displays stability. As his sorrow in the Yassıada executions 
and lately his disapproval of the execution of Abdullah Öcalan proves his 
sincerity in his thoughts on the death penalty. 
 Despite his resignation from the RPP, Ecevit’s influence in the party was 
felt during the party congresses. The RPP was turned into a two-headed 
party, and this tense mood continued till the 5th extraordinary party congress. 
İnönü’s sensitivity about the distortion of the six arrows and on the party’s 
socialist frame went hand in hand with his accusations of Ecevit such as 
‘daydreamer’, ‘intriguer’, ‘ungrateful’...but these did not halt Ecevit’s rise in 
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the congress. In May 1972, Bülent Ecevit , became head of the RPP, the first 
change in the top leadership since the death of Atatürk in 1938. He was 
young and dynamic, and determined to move the party away from its 
traditional image as ‘the political arm of the etatist elite’24 and as a party of   
the ‘chief’ to a party of ‘people’.  
After the resignation of İsmet İnönü, the party entered the 1973 
campaign. There were signs of change during the election campaign. Ecevit 
drew large and enthusiastic crowds wherever he appeared. The atmosphere 
he generated was optimistic and emphasized his personal appeal and his 
commitment to democracy. Ecevit was greeted with the slogans of ‘Our 
Hope is Ecevit’ (Umudumuz Ecevit) and ‘Populist Ecevit’ (Halkçı Ecevit) at 
campaign rallies around the country. He was dubbed Karaoğlan (a popular 
young folk hero), and his election manifesto, entitled ‘Towards Bright Days’ 
(Ak Günlere), was sold in large quantities.25  He became to be known with 
the ‘Ecevit-blue’ as he could easily be distinguished with his blue shirt 
among the masses wearing white shirts. Election-busses in the election 
campaign were also another novelty for the people. The idea of using bus in 
the election campaign was first suggested by Rahşan Ecevit. Although they 
were criticized, the impact of making speeches on the bus was undeniable.26 
The RPP joined the elections with its new cadre (67 per cent of the members 
were replaced with younger ones) and with an election report that evaluated 
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the past debates and offered new plans for the future. The outcome of the 14 
October 1973 elections was a victory for the Ecevit’s RPP garnering 33.3% 
of the votes. Ecevit was the Prime Minister in the coalition government of 
RPP and NSP (National Salvation Party) and Necmeddin Erbakan become 
the deputy prime minister.  
 After the seven-month coalition, Ecevit accomplished some things that 
would increase the prestige of the RPP. Offering high prices to agricultural 
produce, and supporting the producer were positive improvements in the 
context of domestic politics. However, the main decisions that augmented the 
national honor were taken in the foreign relations. The first one was to 
abolish the prohibition on opium planting which was implemented during the 
interregnum of 12 March 1971 to please the United States, leaving half a 
million producers unemployed. Although it was stated that strict regulations 
were undertaken to prevent heroin production, the USA was displeased. In 
this tense condition the Greek junta tried to occupy  Northern Cyprus. Turkey 
had looked for peaceful solution as a guarantor state. Despite Turkey’s 
seeking peace, the indifference of the USA and England to the genocide of 
the Turks on the island and to the occupation of the island made Turkey to 
make a military operation, namely ‘peace operation’, on the island in 20 July 
1974. During these days, Ecevit’s knowledge of international politics and his 
defense of the operation with his perfect English increased his fame  
worldwide. It was written Karaoğlan (dusky boy) and Ecevit everywhere. 
The ‘Myth of Karaoğlan’ that began with his beating the unbeatable İnönü, 
was consolidated as ‘Conqueror of Cyprus’. 27  
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 However, the coalition government ended with the resignation of Ecevit 
due to discrepancies with his partner, Erbakan. His declaration was useful to 
understand his political character:  
I have no greed for any position. I can quit my duty and still have no 
avarice for any position. To begin in another office is not hard for me. 
You assume that you can make Ecevit to do whatever you want since 
Ecevit will never abandon the government. But you are mistaken.28  
 
Besides the discrepancies between coalition partners, Ecevit believed that he 
could call early elections, get rid of his coalition partner, and establish a 
purely RPP government. But this ploy did not work, and instead a new JP-
NAP-NSP29 coalition government emerged to rule Turkey in 1975. 
 Taking  advantage of being the opposition party, Ecevit spent his time  
organizing the cadres and revising the party program. Being ‘social 
democratic’ and adopting new connotations to the six arrows were the most 
important points that labeled the new party program. While Ecevit was trying 
to improve his party, the “National Front” was governing the country. 
Politically motivated assassinations became a daily and national affair and 
the economy was worsening by 1977. In this tense condition of the country, 
Ecevit had become the “hope” for people. 
 Despite getting 42% of the votes in the 1977 elections, the RPP could not 
form a government by itself, and the result was a minority government under 
the prime ministry of Ecevit. The government was established under the 
novel approach of the RPP; that of ‘convincing’. The RPP convinced 11 
members of parliament from the JP to join it and gave each of them a cabinet 
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post. This government was labeled as “Güneş Moteli Hükümeti”30. In effect, 
this new RPP government was a coalition with 11 ‘one-man’ parties31. In his 
first declaration as prime minister, Ecevit acknowledged that the current 
condition of the economy and the state was a wreck. Since the Turkish 
economy, pressed by rising oil prices and a U.S. arms embargo, showed 
signs of deepening recession. In early 1979, foreign currency reserves 
evaporated and there were many shortages.32The government was helpless 
and ineffective against terrorism and poverty which reached to a new peak. 
The RPP also staged intra-party debates. The ‘Hope’ of party members faded 
and voices arouse against the autocratic manners of Ecevit. Ankara deputy, 
Semih Eryıldız, who had been educated through the party 
organizations,severely criticized Ecevit and likened him to an “unsuccessful 
orchestra conductor”:  
If the orchestra conductor tries to manage each and every organ by 
himself this would harm the coherence in the orchestra. If he demands 
to play all the organs by himself, the orchestra would turn into 
something else. To re-enable the harmony and re-organize thousands of 
voices are the thing what is expected from the chief.33   
 
Allegations of some deputies, the discrepancies between the independent 
deputies and the government, and the severe criticisms of  TUSİAD in 
newspapers lasted for months, and put the government in a very unpleasant 
situation. Both the objections of the people, businessmen, opposition parties 
and the party members’ severe criticisms made Ecevit to resign. 
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 After his resignation, Demirel’s minority government of JP won a vote of 
confidence in the parliament. They took drastic measures to solve the 
economic crises and a program to liberalize the economy. Political violence 
continually rose, with 25 people dying each day by summer 1980. The 
parliament stopped functioning and could not even elect a new president. In 
such a kind of atmosphere, the Chief of the General Staff presented a letter to 
Demirel which hinted at cooperation between the RPP and JP in order to 
obstruct anarchy and terror in the country. The formation of a coalition 
government between RPP and JP was also suggested in this context. 
However, while Ecevit displayed a conciliatory posture, Demirel expressed a 
distant attitude to the idea. While the number of dead reached to 25 and the 
injured to 20-25 per day in the country, the government could not take the 
necessary measures and under these conditions the last scene could not be 
different from what Ecevit described: 
The scene from Turkey is as if a football game is being played. The 
political parties and the politicians are in the field. On the other hand 
the great majority of the society is in the grand stand as spectators. It 
is a fault to assume the democratic political contest as a game just to 
watch. The politics can easily switch to a mode of a bad game that 
gives disastrous results in the countries that take the democracy as 
Turkey does take. I have fear that the last scene will be in the way 
that: Someone appears, blows the whistle, “the play is over, 
everybody is to go home” says he and the democracy which turned 
into a nonsense game is over.34  
  
The armed forces did the same thing as they blew the whistle and 
cancelled the game on 12 September 1980. The coup outlawed all political 
parties and banned their top leaders from political activity up to ten years. In 
the opinion of the military government of 1980-83, the coalition governments 
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were the source of most of ills in Turkish politics. Thus when the military 
regime designed a new Constitution, electoral law, and political parties’ act, 
it sought to ensure that the danger of coalition governments would not return. 
To leave nothing to chance in the 1983 elections, the authorities vetoed all 
political parties they thought damaged the Turkish political system.35   
 
The Meaning of ‘Left of Center’ 
The maxim ‘left of center’ was adopted before the 1965 general elections 
by the RPP as a slogan marking a fundamental change in the ideological rhetoric 
of the party. The roots of this slogan could be traced back to the October 1964 
Party congress, when the party adopted a declaration entitled  ‘Our Ideal of a 
Progressive Turkey’. Turhan Fevzioğlu and Bülent Ecevit, two intellectual 
leaders widely regarded as rising stars, developed this program. This declaration 
dealt with topics as land reform, social justice, social security, economic 
development, ‘democratic’ etatism, education, secularism, the fine arts, 
nationalism and youth.36   
The left of center movement adopted a version of populism that differed 
from that of the 1930s populism. Although the latter accepted the existence of  
classes, on the other hand it opposed clashes of  classes. It was a supporter of 
social justice, social guarantees and freedom, and took the right of free enterprise 
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as one of these freedoms. Social democracy was seen as a tool that would enable  
enacting  social reforms in order to reach a better functioning democracy.37 
However, the-left-of center policy created factions among the 
Republicans as the ideology carried controversial points. Not only did the maxim 
“left of center’ created debates within the party but also the rival parties targeted 
their criticisms on the new slogan. During the 1965 election campaigns, Demirel 
distorted the ‘left of center’ and played with it as the ‘center of left’. He also 
repeatedly declared: “Communism will not enter Turkey because our population 
is 98 percent Muslim” and “left of center is the road to Moscow and we are right 
of center and on the path of God”38 
The 1965 elections resulted with the failure of the RPP and most of the 
blame was put on the newly adopted slogan. Ecevit wrote a book entitled Left of 
Center, in October 1966 where he underlined that he would not make 
concessions in this ideology and this attitude stood as the corner stone of his 
decisiveness and insistence in the ‘left of center’ in the future as well. Until 
Ecevit became the party leader in 1972, this debate between the conservative and 
the progressive factions of the party continued. Through the encouragement of 
Ecevit, who tried to discard the old traditions of the RPP, and with the 
socioeconomic changes,  the party experienced radical changes. The RPP shifted 
its party base to include the growing working class, which had been 
underprivileged vis-a-vis rapid industrialization and economic growth. This shift 
marked political recognition of the social classes and their interests. From this 
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point on, the RPP implemented politics based on class appeal.39 Frank Tachau 
explains this shift in the electoral base as, “...from the old coalition of elites at 
the center and periphery to a predominantly class-based alignment, i.e. from a 
cultural to a functional basis.”40 
In the 1973 elections the RPP emerged as the strongest party with 185 
seats, polling 33.3% of the popular vote. After many years of electoral 
disappointments, the Republicans were able to constitute the largest group in the 
assembly with 41 percent of the parliamentary seats.41 The RPP managed to 
combine ideological support with the aspirations and  expectations of the urban 
low-income groups and of  peasantry in 1973. The socioeconomic changes of the 
period assisted a great deal in increasing the electoral appeal of the RPP. 42 This 
success can also be seen as the outcome of the adoption of the left-of-center 
slogan. 
 
Democratic Leftist Stance in the ‘Left of Center’ 
 
 The line of thought based on left of center had firstly emerged in the RPP 
with the ‘left of center’ movement. For, Bülent Ecevit, democratic left 
movement emerged in accordance with the conditions of Turkey. So it flourished 
as a native movement. It did not take its roots from Marxism. According to 
Ecevit, this movement also had a function of reconciling the Turkish leftist 
intellectuals and society. In a speech Ecevit indicated that; 
The most crucial feature that distinguishes the democratic left from the 
scientific left is that the former concept carries the notion of ‘peasantry’ 
per se. There is no place for them in scientific doctrines. However, it is 
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a fact that the suppressed villagers are the ones that form the larger part 
of the public.43 
 
In his book, Left of Center Ecevit portrays the differences of the 
democratic left from both right and left trends. As Ecevit asserted, the right is 
conservative against the revolutionary mood of the left of center. The former is 
on the side of a formal democracy, which oppresses the human will and 
minimizes freedom of thought. When we compare left-of-center and leftist 
trends, the former is more democratic. Moreover, the ultra-left vision lacks 
freedom of thought, freedom of open election, the freedom of society and the 
freedom of autonomous organizations’ to check and balance the power of 
government. People will not be free without these rights. In the ultra-left there is 
the sovereignty of the state, however in the left of center the sovereignty belongs 
to the people.44 
When we focus on the factors of Ecevit’s preference of a different route 
from his school of politics; the first and foremost factor was RPP’s strong ties 
with the past. As Fikret Bila states it, Ecevit believed that some of the traditions 
had to be revised in a parallel line with the changing society. But, it was hard to 
catch up with the improving society with an old establishment. For instance, 
Ecevit was not etatist, in the ideological sense, however it was really hard to 
renounce it in RPP limits, since it was a traditional stance of the party. Secondly, 
the priority given to progressive-intellectuals (ilerici-aydın) had always irritated 
him. It seemed easier to surpass such kind of ill attitudes in a new establishment. 
In this way, the potential of social democrats would be better channeled.45 After 
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the abolition of the political bans on the pre-1980 parties, Ecevit displayed his 
decisiveness in not taking place in the RPP rows and acknowledged that:  
The RPP is a party which belongs to the bourgeoisie, it could not be 
converted into a social democrat party. I have a new paradigm of 
organization in my mind. Although this model can take 30 years to be 
accomplished, it is certain that a democratic party can not be 
established in another way. 46    
 
Rahşan Ecevit also depicted the reason of the need of a new party as 
follows, “ We cannot be together with the ailing structures that are established 
with the permission of the council. In the case of our being together with these 
parties we would not have a different claim.” 
 Another important feature of the DLP was that it was not in the mood to 
unite with other leftist parties. Rahşan Ecevit insisted on the point that they were 
not open to all kinds of left, but only to the ones who can sincerely adopt   the 
‘democratic left’.47 The Ecevit couple, from the beginning, in fact shaped the 
structure of the party that now resembles a religious brotherhood. To preserve 
the unity and coherence in the party, Ecevits  followed a meticulous and careful 
policy, and as a result a brotherhood-like party has emerged. At the beginning of 
the establishment process, Rahşan Ecevit effectively pointed to this subject as: 
“any kind of opinion can be accepted in a democracy, but it can not be said ‘yes’ 
to any ideology or person that has a different ideology, in a party.”48 
 Rahşan Ecevit, in her article published in the Turkish daily Cumhuriyet49, 
portrays the structural differences of the Democratic Left Party from the other 
leftist parties. (at that time there were SODEP, Social Democrat Party, and HP, 
People’s Party): 
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- DLP is founded from the grassroots not from the top as the other 
parties. The commitment of the people would be prevalent, continuos 
and influential at the workings for the party. We guarantee these 
features in our party program. 
- We give great importance to a clear and coherent understanding of the 
democratic left. Our doors are strictly closed to the ones who would 
try to change the direction towards a more leftist or rightist way and to 
the ones who are in favor of ethnic or religious sectarianism. 
- There will be no concession in the understanding of the Kemalist 
nationalism and secularism. 
- While our party will benefit from the accumulations of the previous 
democratic leftist movements, it would not be in the way of reviving 
the past. Our party is emerging as a brand new party purified of the 
inconsistencies and defects of the past. 
- Our administrators will be chosen among the people. The authority 
will be invested in the people. 
- There will be no duality/gap between intellectuals and the people. 
- This party is different with its ideology, way of organization, cadres 
and structure.50 
 
 
Thus, the path that carried the DLP to the center of the political spectrum 
in 1990s was drawn in the departure process from the RPP. The party that was 
planning to be established would not be leftist in terms of harboring worries for 
the international left. Rather, it would be more native, in that it would adopt a 
‘left’ that is more inclined to the national problems and search remedies for the 
sake of the nation.  Moreover, a leftist party should take its power from the 
masses. However, the extent of the DLP’s leftism was insufficient as people’s 
involvement with the party was restricted. Ecevit depicted ‘democracy’ as the 
main and major diverging quality of the DLP from the Marxist tradition as will 
be presented below. The extent of democracy in the DLP will also be discussed 
in the following sections.   
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Diverging Qualities of DLP from Other Leftist Movements 
 
 
The main difference of DLP from the Social-Democratic Populist Party 
(SDPP) and RPP is the  ‘democratic left’ character of the DLP. On the other side, 
the latter label themselves as social democrats. Ecevit, beginning after 1965, had 
always used the democratic left concept in the RPP, and he put it in the party 
regulations and program. Although these two concepts were used as synonyms 
by most of the people, Ecevit insisted on using ‘democratic left’ in his speeches. 
Ecevit answers the question of why he uses the democratic left instead of social 
democracy, in the weekly Yankı magazine: 
Initially what concerns me is not the historical roots of social 
democracy rather the practices of it in our days.”51 
The social democrats in the west struggled so much to set themselves 
free of the roots of the historical doctrines of Marxism. And these 
difficulties have been continuing. The ones, who adopted a strict 
Marxism, criticized the social democrats at the point of being infidel 
to Marxism. To guard themselves against such criticisms some social 
democrats involved in a search of various interpretations of Marxism.” 
When we come to Turkey, our social democrats also take Marxism as 
their source that means Turkish social democrats would also delve into 
the same quarrels of western socialists, which already lost the qualities 
of origin. For this reason I find it useful to name the social democratic 
movement in Turkey as ‘democratic left’ from the beginning. 
Secondly, democratic left as a concept contains economic democracy 
besides political and social democracy. Since it is complementary of 
the other two. A society that manages to establish economic 
organizations would better obtain a consolidated democracy.52 
  
While the DLP tried to position itself as the only true party of the workers, it 
depicted the SDPP as an elitist and old-fashioned party.53 Ecevit characterized 
the SDPP as not only elitist, but as representing a notion of reform from above, 
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‘for the people but against the wishes of people.’54 However as Andrew Mango 
indicates, “Ecevit’s anti-elitism which has now found full expression in the DLP 
has had the effect of handing over to the SDPP not the political and social elite, 
but, at least a large part of Turkish intelligentsia.”55 
 The most diverging feature between the SDPP and DLP is the former’s 
overt adoption of the RPP’s heritage despite the latter’s refusal of it. The DLP 
displayed this denial of the past in the way that it did not insert the six arrows in 
its party program. Instead, DLP put forward its ideals and objectives as, 
“Freedom and Sovereignty, Justice and Equality, Democracy, Just progress and 
Welfare, Solidarity, Peace, Healthy and Secure Life.” In this respect, the SDPP 
defined itself with the six arrows. As Ergun Özbudun indicates, another 
difference is,  
Whereas the SDPP program gives a prominent role to the state in the 
economy, the DLP is more inclined to diversify the economic structure 
by encouraging cooperatives and producers’ unions, with a view to 
preventing both state and private monopolies.56 
 
 
A Foundation Story with Full of Hopes 
 
After the 1980 military intervention, Ecevit was sent to a military camp in 
Gelibolu Hamzakoy. During those 28 days in Hamzakoy, he found the chance to 
evaluate the current conditions. He tried to answer two questions: to what extent 
he would remain loyal to the intra-party structure of the RPP and to the 
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objectives of the army. He found the solution in the idea of tabula rasa, to erase 
everything that belonged to the past and to re-begin everything.57 
Although he was politically banned and it was forbidden to write and 
even speak, he did not remain silent. With the help of Aydın Doğan, owner of 
the daily Milliyet, he returned to journalism as editor of weekly magazine Arayış 
(Search) and formed a public opinion against the military intervention. The 
military censors banned an editorial he wrote on torture and all copies of the 
issue concerned were confiscated on 2 June 1981.58 However, he always drew 
the attention of the military due to his declarations and writings. He was put into 
the prison several times and brought to court several times. Meanwhile, the idea 
of founding a new party was getting stronger in his mind.  Ecevit embarked on a 
long foreign tour, travelling to “Sweden, Denmark, Austria, and Germany. He 
spoke at meetings about democracy, human rights, and social democracy.”59  
While he was away from the Turkish political scene, Ecevit remained active by 
sending messages to his country through his speeches, articles, and letters. He 
was elaborating on the draft of the party program. Through the guidance of his 
experiences in the RPP, he was sure of the fact that the new party should not be 
under the hegemony of a person or a group. In this respect, some groups were 
founded in the party organizations that would control each other, in every 
executive group and in cities. In such a kind of atmosphere in 19 August 1984 
Rahşan Ecevit declared the foundation of the new party, DLP. 
The DLP was established on 13 November 1983, and Rahşan Ecevit was 
chosen as the chairman. Most of the 612 founders of the party were  workers and  
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peasants, due to the political ban on former politicians. The symbol of the party 
was a white pigeon, as it referred to Ecevit as the prime minister of the Cyprus 
Peace Operation, and it had the divine connotations in the Bektasi traditions, as 
well.   
 Interestingly, despite the strong emphasis on democracy in intra-party 
politics, there were only two people who could manage to survive from the first 
MKYK (Central Executive Board)60. They were Yaşar Mengi and Rahşan 
Ecevit, others have left the party as they were not in good terms with the party 
executive. 
First oppositions in the party emerged after the second meeting of 
Council of Founders of the DLP. The former RPP ministers replaced five of the 
MKYK members. All of the eastern and southeastern city organization were 
dissolved. The ones who dide not approve the replacement gathered under the 
leadership of Celal Kürkoğlu, the founder of the Adıyaman party organizations. 
Although their number had reached to 233, this opposition was hindered again 
by a replacement by the non-oppositional Council of Founders within 45 
minutes. After the by-elections of 1986, Kürkoğlu and the 233 opposing 
members were expelled from the party.  
 When the political restrictions were abolished as the result of a 
referendum in 1987, Ecevit took the leadership of the DLP, on 13 September 
1987. However, after the failure of the November elections, he announced that 
he was resigning from the politics. His behavior depicted consistency with his 
resignation from the chairmanship of the RPP in 1971 and from the prime 
ministry in 1974. The statement sent shock waves through the DLP, which was 
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based more on Ecevit’s leadership. Necdet Karababa was elected as the new 
chairman, and the party attempted to go on as usual. However, in January 1989 
Ecevit returned, immediately retook over the DLP leadership post, and even had 
his wife Rahşan elected deputy chair.61 
 However, although 1987 elections was a failure for the DLP, as it only 
received 8.5% and failed to qualify for seats in the parliament, it depicted the 
significant rise of leftist votes after the 1980 intervention. The SDPP emerged 
relatively victorious with 24.8% of the vote, following the Motherland Party that 
garnered 36.3% of the vote. The local elections of 1989 was a turning point for  
Left and SDPP, obtaining 28.7 per cent of the local executives and taking the 
biggest slice of the total vote.62   However, the SDPP could not sustain this 
success until the 1989 elections due to factions within, especially due to the 
quarrels between Erdal İnönü and Deniz Baykal. Although the SDPP could not 
came to power by itself after the 1991 elections, the Left was in government after 
12 years (since 1979) in the coalition with Demirel’s True-Path Party. 
 Ecevit was also again in the parliament after 11 years with seven DLP 
deputies. The coalition government wrote the law that enabled the re-
establishment of  parties, which were closed due to the 1980 intervention. The 
common demand was for the unification of the left under the direction of the 
RPP. According to Ecevit, the new address of the left would be the DLP, so he 
refused calls for unification. The RPP held its opening assembly and elected 
Deniz Baykal as chairman, in 9 September 1992. The SDPP experienced 
problems from its inception. Under the deputy prime ministry of Erdal İnönü 
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three events occurred that damaged the party’s eminence; the delinquency in 
arresting the murderers of Uğur Mumcu, the passivity of İnönü in ‘Sivas 
massacre’ and lastly the İSKİ Gate.  
In 1993 the unification attempts in the left intensified. While the 
flirtations between the RPP and SDPP deputies were ongoing the DLP stood 
distant. Ecevit was accusing the RPP with ‘cliquishness’ and the SDPP with 
having close relations with the opportunists. 26 March 1994 local elections 
interfered the unification attempts in the left. 
 The leftist parties got clobbered in the elections. The SDPP was worn-
out due to the ISKI Gate. Although it took the lead 5 years ago, the party only 
managed to be the fourth in the elections. The DLP also experienced a 
frustration. Most of the criticisms targeted Ecevit because of his obstinacy in not 
uniting with SDPP. The failure in the elections and re-foundation of RPP 
accelerated  resignations from the DLP. 
 Ecevit’s manner of opposing the unification of the Left increased its 
validity due to the discrepancies experienced after the union of RPP and SDPP.  
To unite did not mean to become a whole entity; the ones who saw the 
difficulties of uniting in the left had begun to come in the same line of thought 
with Ecevit. The struggles for the leadership in the RPP made people lose their 
confidence in the party. These events served to the advantage of the DLP, as it is 
indicated in the PIAR-Gallup’s research; 44 per cent of the participants 
explained the decrease in confidence to the RPP with because of intra-party 
struggles. The leader of RPP, Ertuğrul Günay, resigned from his party in 18 
January 1985 and chose to join the DLP. This transfer increased the attentions to 
the DLP. When it was announced that the election would be held in 27 
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December 1995, Ecevit tried to catch up a good atmosphere before the election. 
In so doing, he managed to get Mümtaz Soysal on 21 November and Tahir Köse, 
RPP ministers, into the DLP lines. İsmail Cem and Timurçin Savaş also became 
new members on 26 November 1995. 
While the 27 December 1995 elections positioned the DLP as the best of 
the leftist parties, the increase in the number of the deputies increased the 
problems in the party, as well. When the Iğdır deputy Adil Aşırım, preferred to 
be in the Motherland Party (MP) after the elections, suspicion occurred about the 
arranging of the candidate lists. In the meantime,  discrepancies between Ecevit 
and Edirne deputy, Erdal Kesebir, who was responsible for the organization of 
the party, had emerged on the candidate lists. After the failure of the 1996 local 
elections, the opposition increased in the party. Kesebir and his 136 friends tried 
to gather the party assembly. However, Ecevit did not accept the request, 
claiming that 142 members were needed to gather the assembly. Aftermath, 
Kesebir and his friends were expelled from the party on 17 September 1996. 
Kürkoğlu event and this movement exemplified the hegemony of the Ecevit and 
the undemocratic structure of the party. Kesebir and his friends transferred to 
DTP after they had conveyed the “Çile Çicekleri” movement before the 18 April 
1999 elections. Mümtaz Soysal and Gökhan Çapoğlu also resigned from the 
party as a response to the party’s distorted paradigm of organization. However, 
Soysal’s resignation was also due to Ecevit’s convergence to Fethullah Gülen’s 
brotherhood under the context of “secularism respectful of beliefs”.63 
 After the 28th February period and the dissolution of the Welfare-Path 
government, Ecevit became the deputy prime minister in the Motherland-left-D 
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(Anasol-D) government. Ecevit displayed a conciliatory partnership with Mesut 
Yılmaz, the chairman of Motherland party. However, the DTP (Democratic 
Turkey Party) always created problems in the government. The demand for an 
early election especially from  Deniz Baykal (chairman of the RPP) emerged. It 
was a common idea that to convey the elections under the prime ministry of 
Mesut Yılmaz would not be appropriate. So, in 11 January 1999, it was decided 
that the election would be held under the governance of DLP minority 
government. On 16 February 1999, the DLP had turned out to be not only the 
vanguard of the leftist parties, but also of the rightist parties as well. It was due 
to the capture of Öcalan, after 25 years of terror in the country. This capture 
played a crucial role in the success of the party in the elections. 64 
 
 The Undemocratic Face of the DLP under the Guise of Democracy 
 
 The impatience towards opposing voices has become conventional in the 
DLP, which was established on the premises of perfect democracy, freedom of 
thought both in the country and in the party as well. Far from being a party of the 
masses, the DLP had become a stage for one-man show. In accordance with the 
cases of Celal Kürkoğlu and Erdal Kesebir, Haluk Özdalga portrays the ills of 
the party. 
 As one of the founders of the DLP and a member of the MKYK, Özdalga 
depicts the shift in the party, in the 1990s as follows: 
There were two things that attracted people to the party at the 
beginning; one of them was the leadership characteristic of Ecevit and 
the other was the discourse and principle of the party on the 
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organization that takes the power from its constituencies. In this way 
democracy and discipline would have progressed together...The reason 
of the deep crises that the party experienced was due to the disbelief in 
the compatibility of  discipline and intra-party democracy; leadership 
and organization, either. A centralist and hegemonic party had 
emerged to the extent that no one would imagine. The fear that 
‘somebody would capture our organization’ had begun to shape the 
whole structure of the party. The same fear also paved way to the 
factions among the members as ‘loyals’, ‘traitors’, ‘the potential 
traitors’, ‘the friends of the traitors’...However the party members 
demand transparency and intra-party democracy, that would bear the 
freedom of speech, of being candidate, of making congress...I do not 
know what would be the future of the DLP, but it is obvious that to 
reach a democratic structure with the current line is impossible.” 65 
  
Sami Doğan, who is also among the first MKYK members, complains of 
similar distortions in the party. According to him, the MKYK has lost its 
function and exists only for the sake of the law. The constituencies have no 
control over the party executive. He makes his last criticism as “The party has 
transformed into barracks and the members into soldiers.”66 
 Teoman Ergül also analyzes the structure of the DLP during the period it 
was being established and finds out some innate defaults of the party. For 
instance, to accept Ecevit as the ‘natural leader’ (doğal lider), and accepting his 
infallibility as a prerequisite turned the party into a Catholic Church, as he 
asserts. The excessive fear against the possible entry of unwanted persons into 
the newly established party created strict control mechanisms. For instance, 
every founding member would take the responsibility for the nominee that he 
suggested. In a way it was a system of ‘bail’.67 Rahşan Ecevit also concedes this 
fact as: “We receive the application of each founding member. These members 
empower new members in their environment through a careful study. By this 
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way, nothing is left to chance...” 68 It is uncertain from whom the selection 
committee formed and by what criteria they select the members. Far from being 
democratic, this system functions in a blurred manner.  
 The principle of organizing from the grassroots seemed problematic from 
the beginning, points out Haluk Şahin.69 The initial handicap in that is the 
political convention of Turkey that opposes such a structure. Secondly there 
exists a discrepancy in the understandings of the party members and the 
executive organs in the concept of ‘organizing from the grassroots’. The 
headquarters think in the way that they can also conduct the pioneers in this 
building process. Lastly this organizing model is in contradiction with the idea of 
establishing the party with new members. These would be the ones, especially 
who did not formerly deal with politics. However, as Şahin asserts, this model 
requires experienced politicians that perfectly know the conditions of their areas 
instead of the ones that have no idea of their environment and the demands of the 
constituents of that area. Despite Ecevit’s vowe of a party of grassroots it will 
not be wrong to acknowledge that, the grassroots did not elect the vanguards but 
the latter selected the former. 70 
 Saffet Korkmaz 71, while analyzing the structure and the ills of the DLP, 
asserts that the party does not carry any of the characteristics of a leftist party. It 
is in the sense that, a leftist party is open to masses and participatory as well, but 
the DLP is not so. She points out other deficiencies of the party as: weak rights 
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of membership, lack of intra-party democracy, weak organizations. These are the 
fundamental features of a leftist party according to her.72 
 Far from being a leftist party, the DLP lacks even the basic principles of a 
democratic party. As Korkmaz acknowledges,  
The ministers are not officially enrolled in the party. The executive is 
changed nearly every day in the party organizations. The most striking 
point is that the party limits the number of the delegates with 149 in the 
villages, since in the case of 150 delegates the party should make the 
city congresses with them. The lack of respect to the rights of the 
members to such an extent cannot be seen in other parties, even in the 
NAP.73 
 
 The common objection among the party members was also the same, as it 
is stated in Koloğlu’s work: “No matter what the size of the cities or villagers is, 
our congresses are still made with 149 delegates. The executive board that comes 
into power with this congress is replaced with the appointed ones without giving 
any explanation. In this way DLP’s links to the past can not be preserved.”74 
 However, there are the ones who are content with the undemocratic 
structure of the party. For instance, Murat Gözütoklusu, who was the candidate 
for Çankaya Municipality in 1999 elections, tries to defend the good sides of 
DLP’s lack of organizations. He claims that the weakness in the organizational 
level make the members less bound to certain positions. Moreover, the 
uncertainty in the membership of the participants hinders cleintalism and 
politicians’ filling the staff with the party members when they come to power, as 
nobody is sure of one’s own destiny in the given position.75 
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  Hüsamettin Özkan’s role in the party was also severely criticized by 
most of the party members. It was ironically said that the party has two 
committees, the first is composed of two and a half person (Rahşan Ecevit, 
Bülent Ecevit, Hüsamettin Özkan) and they come together at Or-an. The non-
functional committee is in the headquarters of the party. 76 
There are also some hereditary features of the DLP that display 
similarities with the RPP. The RPP is not a party of masses as it lacks the system 
of regular enrollment of the members and is not dependent on the members in 
fiscal terms.77  It is the same case in the DLP, since even some of the deputies of 
the party are not officially enrolled in the party. Nobody knows who is exactly  
member of the party; the Ecevit couple keep the enrolled ones secret, as Saffet 
Korkmaz indicates.   
Every party has cliques and opposition. What the cliques have are the 
power, money and resource. The opposition is usually younger and ambitious. 
They have drive and energy. If the cliques are not able to co-opt opposition, 
there will be revolution. The DLP has never been able to co-opt the opposition 
who would bring change to the party and also to the state and society. This is due 
to the lack of intra-party democracy. When the opposition heightens their voice, 
they are excluded from the party and this fact precludes change.78 This fact was 
also observed in the 5th congress of the DLP; the candidate for the chairmanship, 
Sema Pişkinsüt’s speech was hindered by unanimity of the delegates.  Moreover, 
not only she was jeered as ‘traitor’ but also the delegates in the congress beat her 
son. Despite the great efforts to silence Pişkinsüt, 86 delegates voted for her. In 
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fact it is clear that silencing her meant silencing democracy. This kind of 
democracy was described as “Ecevit’s democracy” in daily Radikal.79 
 
An analysis of Ecevit’s Leadership and Personality 
Leadership is  willingness to accept the responsibility for results, Ecevit 
displayed this willingness in many cases in his political life. For instance, his 
preference of the left-of center slogan in the 1960s, while the Marxist Left was 
getting highly popular among the university students, and also supporting the 
policy against the conservative republicans in the party depicted his willingness 
to stand behind his words.  
The Cyprus Peace Operation in 1974 is a crucial example for his taking 
responsibility and actualizing great undertakings. This intervention stands as a 
great and extraordinary achievement because it is doubtful whether another 
leader of Turkish politics could have displayed the same performance in those 
days.80 His obstinacy in not uniting with the RPP and preferring to continue his 
own route against the ‘intriguer’ accusations are decisions that require a 
responsible leader. 
Having vision is a must for a leader. Ecevit’s vision put its stamp on most 
of his successes. On the eve of entering into politics, he chose to start with 
healing the major deficiencies of Turkish democracy. To improve democracy 
with freedoms and to add ‘social’ content to the democratic republic were the 
issues he elaborated on, in the guidance of his vision.   
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Foresight is also important for a leader. It is the ability to make 
predictions about the future and to act accordingly. Ecevit is a leader who has 
foresight. One of the proofs of his foresight is his warning of the 1980 military 
intervention. Ecevit had brought a coalition proposal to the Justice Party as he 
had foreseen the military intervention. The ongoing terror and anarchy, and the 
incapacity of the government in halting the events signaled for a coup that was 
anticipated by Ecevit.81  
 Ecevit is a leader who is famous for his honesty. However, his honesty 
turned out to be such an infallible feature that it absorbs some dishonest 
occasions and nothing changes in Ecevit’s honesty. For instance, he formed a 
government by violating the Turkish political morals for the first time in Turkey. 
The ‘Güneş Moteli’ government was formed by perverting 11 JP deputies with 
the promise of appointing them as ministers in 1978. The two ministers of Ecevit 
in this government engaged in illegal dealings and were tried at the High Court 
and sentenced to prison. Moreover, the 55th government in which Ecevit was the 
deputy prime minister was also established with the formula after 28 February 
soft coup82. This government also stood as a premier example of a government, 
which was overthrown with interpellation in our political history 83 
 There is an ongoing dispute regarding Ecevit’s transformation. His 
adopting diverging policies throughout time are both criticized and applauded. 
For instance, his stance on the military interventions has been changed. Although 
he stood against the previous military interventions, he now owes the 
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continuation of his career and his success to another (soft) coup. Besides the 
change in his stance against the military, there occurred several shifts in his 
political discourse as well. However, these shifts can be evaluated from a more 
positive front. Since, as Köseoğlu indicates, leaders should be the agents of 
change.  This change can be supplied either through trust or dissent. The dissent 
and conflict that Ecevit adopted in the 1970s brought polarization to the country 
and resulted in the breakdown of  democracy. However, after the establishment 
of the DLP, Ecevit chose to take upon a positive change as a result of his 
experiences. His discourse had become more inclusive and mild, and he aimed at 
the participation of the majority of society in politics.84 In this context his display 
of sympathy for Fethullah Gülen and adopting the principle of ‘secularism 
respectful of beliefs’ are positive shifts in his political discourse. As an 
explanation to the criticisms made on Ecevit’s closeness to Fethullah Gülen, he 
asserts his views on F.Gülen in an interview made by Fikret Bila, 
I have met Fethullah Gülen three times. We did not talk about politics in any 
of them, rather our conversation was mostly on the relation between  
philosophy and religion…I do not see F.Gülen and the ones around him as a 
threat to secularism and to the regime. Their emphasis on education is also 
very important. They have been founding schools in Siberia and Mongolia 
and this is proof of the compatibility of their philosophy with secularism. (As 
those countries would not let them to found such schools if they had seen 
them as a threat to secularism.) As far as I know they are against the regimes 
of  Iran and Saudi Arabia. They do not support the WP and they refuse the 
offers to organize in a political party. Therefore, I do not see any relation 
between fundamentalism (irtica) and F.Gülen’s environment.85 
   
Ecevit’s approach on this issue is another evidence of his conciliatory 
character.  He can be named as norm conformist, as he has never dreamed of 
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changing the system. His policy aims at ameliorating the system. In Atilla 
İlhan’s words, he is a ‘lukewarm leftist’. 
 Without doubt Ecevit is a charismatic leader. He has dominance, vision, 
strong conviction and is reliable. Moreover, he is enthusiastic, self-assured and 
self-confident. In fact, his autocratic character stems from his excessive self-
confidence. He has a well-established communication with his followers. It is 
due to his interest in literature, he can give his messages succinctly both in orally 
and written.  
 He stands out among Turkey’s politicians for his financial honesty. When 
he first became prime minister in 1974, he and his wife refused to move into the 
grand house that goes with the job, preferring to stay in their modest flat in 
suburban Ankara, where they still live. They still shop together and cook their 
own meals. When Ecevit became prime minister in January 1999, he swapped 
his official Mercedes for a locally assembled Fiat. 
 The character of the DLP has turned out to be the character of Ecevit 
since its foundation. The party is democratic to the extent of Ecevit’s democracy. 
Apart from being a political party in the true sense, the DLP is more likely a 
brotherhood, as already mentioned above. The party members are devoted to 
Ecevit similar to people’s devotion for a religious leader. As one of the party 
members indicated, most of the members label themselves as ‘Ecevitçi” instead 
of identifying themselves with the DLP.  The DLP’s current stance, its shift to 
the center, adopt on of a more nationalistic tone, and entering the 1999 elections 
will be analyzed in the next chapter.   
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Although the 18 April 1999 election campaigns did not display an 
interesting, colorful or excited performance, the election platforms of the Turkish 
political parties, basically the DLP’s election campaign, will be analyzed in a 
detailed fashion to bring a better understanding to the rise of the DLP, in this 
chapter. 
 Before elaborating on the DLP’s election campaign, the Turkish electoral 
system and the political structure of the country on the eve of the elections are 
briefly covered. Prominent newspapers and magazines have been used as the 
basic sources in this chapter as few academic studies have been made on the 
subject and period that has been covered. 
 
The Turkish Electoral System 
 
The 550 members of the TGNA (Turkish Grand National Assembly) are 
elected through a hybrid system. People choose representatives by proportional 
representation from their respective districts, but a party must receive at least 10 
percent of the total national vote as a threshold to get seats in the assembly. 
Therefore, if a particular party wins in a particular district, but does not meet the 
10 percent threshold nationally, its votes are distributed to the other parties that 
win seats in that district. For instance, in the 1995 election, the pro-Kurdish 
rights party, HADEP, was the first choice in Turkey’s majority Kurdish 
southeastern region; however, as HADEP failed to receive 10 percent of the total 
national vote, Welfare, the second-choice party in much of the area, got many of 
those seats. 
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While the 10 percent threshold stands as a default of Turkish electoral 
system that limits  full representation, there are also problems in selecting the 
candidates. “Central Nomination” system is used in the process of choosing 
candidates to the prospective deputies. A few party executives prioritize the 
names of the applicants, and the party leaders make the final decisions. 
Consequently, the deputies entering the Parliament are not “deputies of people”, 
as stipulated in the Constitution, or even “deputies of the party”, as we may all 
think, in actual fact, are the “deputies of the leader”. 86 As Özbudun asserts,  
Central control over candidate selection is both a cause and a 
consequence of the oligarchical tendencies. In addition, this control 
allows party leaders to nominate a relatively large number of political 
novices (usually former prominent bureaucrats) who have no grassroots 
support and are therefore completely depend on party leaders. 87 
 
 The partiality of the electoral system pondered on the results of the 1995 
national elections as well. The WP emerged as the single-largest party with 
21.38 percent of the vote, and 158 deputies. This marked a considerable rise in 
the Islamic influence in the 1995 national elections. This rise was largely at the 
expense of the two center-right parties, True Path and Motherland parties, which 
fell from 27.03 percent to 19.19 percent and from 24.01 percent to 19.65 percent, 
respectively. The election also marked a major shift in the power balance of the 
center-left. In the 1991 election, the SDPP (predecessor of today’s RPP) was far 
stronger than its rival, the DLP, by receiving 20.75 percent of the vote as 
compared to only 10.75 percent for DLP. In 1995, however, DLP received 14.64 
percent to RPP’s 10.71 percent. In the 1995 elections, two parties that did not 
meet the threshold also played key roles. The right-wing Nationalist Action Party 
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(NAP) and the Kurdish HADEP both failed to meet the threshold. Welfare, 
which shares the NAP’s strength in western Turkey’s suburban shantytowns and 
HADEP’s strength in the East and Southeast, undoubtedly benefited from their 
failure. Some of these trends could already be seen in the 1994 municipal 
elections. Welfare won a major victory in the race of municipal elections, 
including those of the two main metropolitan cities, Istanbul the capital of 
Turkish business and Ankara the capital of Turkey. In contrast, Motherland 
received only 14 municipalities; True Path, 12; NAP, 7 and RPP, 5. Welfare also 
came in a close third in both borough representatives and city councils, receiving 
18.94 percent and 19.09 percent of the vote respectively.  
 
 Current Structure of the Turkish Political System  
 
The Turkish political system has been deeply influenced by rapid social 
mobilization, changes of constitutional designs, the Cold War’s end, and ethnic 
strife. All of these factors have contributed a deepening rift based on ethnicity 
and religiosity. These cultural fault lines have contributed to the electorate’s 
fragmentation and party preferences. The constitutional engineering of the 1980s 
failed to constrain the number of parties in the system or limit the role of radical 
and marginal parties. Instead, they have started to influence the competition for 
vote. Parties on the right-of-center are to compete for the ultra right votes. The 
competition for the fringe votes turns into a contest of “who is more religious?” 
and “who is more chauvinistic?” The anti-system parties are caught in this 
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dangerous game of power, while parties that occupy similarly moderate positions 
are kept away from establishing political partnership.88  
 Primordial affiliations have always been important in Turkish politics. 
With the Soviet system’s collapse and the socialists’ crises, cultural 
characteristics gained importance in mobilizing the masses. Religious and ethno-
nationalist identifications started to emerge as new fault lines splitting the 
Turkish electorate into major voting blocks.  
 In the same line of thought, Özbudun asserts that Turkey’s parties and 
party system have been experiencing a chronic institutional decay since the 
1970s. Then he depicts the current maladies of the Turkish political system as 
“fragmentation, ideological polarization and electoral volatility in the party 
system and decline in the organizational capacity of, public support for, and 
identification with individual parties.”89 
  The Turkish political system has been going through a consolidation of 
democracy. Much has been learned and soundly adopted by masses and the elites 
alike since 1950. A secular pluralist political culture has been gradually planted. 
Five decades of experience with multiparty democracy has created a responsible 
electorate, widespread values of pluralism to an unparalleled extent with any 
previous era of Turkish history, and a distinct mass dislike of oligarchic rule. The 
masses have started to assign a positive value to multiparty pluralism, seeming to 
correlate it with their personal welfare. 90 
 Since the 1991 elections, Turkey has suffered from a series of short-lived 
and weak governments. The blame lies partly with the electoral system, as it is 
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mentioned above it is an unhappy compromise between proportional 
representation and first-past-the-post to avoid many headed coalitions, it 
excludes parties that poll less than 10% of the national vote. 
In regard to the political structure of Turkey, it should be noted that there 
is a lack of democracy in the parties as they carry innate deficiencies. “The 
leaders are the emperors of their parties”; they can dismiss members, with their 
absolute control over the all-important party lists at elections, and they never 
seem to retire until their death if they do not lose a party congress by bad luck. 
As Özbudun also indicates, all parties are over-centralized and the central 
executive committees have tremendous power over the local committees.91 
 The main Turkish political parties look hauntingly alike. All of them are 
nationalist to varying degrees, but they all support EU membership. They all are 
in theory uphold the separation of religion and state, although most have Islamist 
links. They all agree that deficits and inflation must be brought down by IMF-
inspired austerity, although they all make immense spending when the elections 
get closer. According to Cüneyt Ülsever, a columnist for the Hürriyet daily, 
parties have all become patronage groups, competing for the privilege of 
applying the same policies.92 
 As a result of the conventional opinion that Turkish political structure 
does not let a long-term coalition, coalitions chose populism instead of long-term 
planning. Civil servants always get increases in salary when the election time 
gets closer. This kind of patronage often blurs into corruption, that is, generally 
defined as “the abuse of public patronage for gain by private interests.”93 Inside 
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the party offices, huge queues of petitioners wait to trade their support for help 
with finding a job or a hospital bed. No company can win a government contact 
without paying a kickback, businessmen say. For instance, Tansu Çiller got into 
trouble when $6.5m disappeared from a government account under her prime 
ministry. Her successor Mesut Yılmaz’s government was also brought down due 
to a scandal during the privatization of a state bank. 94  The first serious 
corruption allegations against the MP surfaced after the conclusion of the tender 
for independent power plants in November 1997. As it was stated in The 
Economist, despite the complaints of Turkish and foreign companies about the 
lack of transparency in the process, “the government failed to provide a 
satisfactory explanation for the award of three of the five plants to a consortium 
headed by a Turkish company with close links to Yılmaz and the MP.” This was 
followed by an more outrageous pretense during the sale of 51 percent of the 
shares of Petrol Ofisi95. The sale was conducted in front of the live TV cameras 
to convince the international finance community that the process was 
transparent. However, surprisingly, a small businessman offered the highest bid 
and had to be proclaimed the winner. The award was switched to the third bidder 
at a meeting of the High Privatization Council presided over by Yılmaz himself, 
as a result of the negotiations behind the scenes. However, it was predicted that 
Yılmaz had again acted in support of another of his favorite businessmen.96 
After giving some basic information on the Turkish electorate system, it 
would be useful to focus on the precautions taken against the rise of the Virtue 
Party and the Kurdist movement before elaborating on the election platforms of 
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the parties in the 18 April 1999 elections. The army, several business circles and 
the media had played a great role in the rise of the DLP with their underpinnings.  
A harsh hindering policy had been led towards PDP and VP, by secular-
oriented establishment. Vural Savaş, ex-chief prosecutor began legal proceedings 
against PDP. Savaş in the indictment claimed that he had “irrefutable proof” that 
PDP had organic links with separatist rebels of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party (PKK) and had become a recruitment center for the guerrillas. 
 Turkish army also put emphasis on the maintenance of the secular 
character of the country. For this end, General Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu, commander-
in-chief of the army, paid a visit to Bülent Ecevit, acting prime minister. 
Followingly, Ecevit told provincial governors, prosecutors and the security 
forces to take all necessary measures against anyone who sought to “exploit 
religion” during the election campaign. Candidates were not be allowed to carry 
out “anti-secular propaganda”, nor would private television and radio stations be 
allowed to broadcast such kind of propaganda. 
 The generals insisted also on a change in the electoral system. They 
wanted a two-round voting system, whereby Kurdish and Islamic parties that got 
through the first round would more likely be rejected by mainstream voters in the 
second, thus ensuring the majority in parliament that would be both secular-
minded and conjugal to a unitary state. 
 Even President Süleyman Demirel, who was supposed to remain above 
domestic politics, made declarations that point on the probability of a military 
intervention in government in case of elections’ resulting in a majority of 
religious votes. So whether the VP would be allowed to form a government if 
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they were to win the general election stood as a crucial factor that discourage 
many from voting for the VP. 97 
The DLP was seen as a remedy against the threat of the VP. Ecevit , had 
been in politics for 42 years, and was the stand-in prime minister leading Turkey 
into its parliamentary election on April 18th, and turned out to be the great hope 
of those Turks who want above all to stop the country’s Islamist getting back in 
the government. The opinion polls suggested that Ecevit’s Democratic Left 
Party, which ranked only fourth in the current parliament, was running almost 
neck-and-neck with the VP, and way ahead of everybody else. 
 VP had a more moderate platform than did Welfare, but many secularists 
harbored doubts about the sincerity of VP’s conversion. The military which 
issued a circular saying that it would defend secularism “at any cost”, had made 
clear that it would oppose Islamists’ return to government 
 
The Discourses and Election Platforms of the Parties on the 
Eve of the Elections 
 
Party programs are the major diverging factor among the parties. The 
speeches of the party executives, the attitude of the party on the social events are 
also the other   factors that draw a party’s identity.98 In order to inform people 
about their political views and future objectives, they prepare their election 
manifestos.  In a way these pamphlets are the main references to get a clear idea 
about a party. Although the reading habits of the Turkish society linger at a 
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highly low level and the audio-visual effects are more influential on them, still 
the election manifestos are crucial in understanding the identity of a political 
party. Hence, to make a sound analysis of the 18 April 1999 elections, it will be 
appropriate to begin with analyzing the election pamphlets of the parties. 
 
Center-Left Parties 
 
Democratic Left Party 
The DLP entered the 18 April elections with very soft messages. Six 
goals of the DLP in its election manifesto were; national unity, secularism 
respectful of beliefs, democracy, fair order, investment for the future and 
powerful and self-esteemed Turkey. (see the political ad. in Appendix 1) Three 
new approaches draw our attention in this pamphlet that are: economic policy, 
foreign policy and secularism. The DLP underlines that “secularism will be 
preserved   in accordance with special sensitivity on not to get in opposite terms 
with the believing masses.” Emphasis on secularism on the one hand, and on the 
other hand trying to preserve the delicate balance between secularism and 
religion, is an unusual phenomenon for a leftist party in Turkey. As Ömer Çaha 
indicates, the leftist parties in Turkey, not only had tried to stand far from the 
religious beliefs but also they made their main objective to fight with those 
masses. DLP’s ability in breaking the general borders of the traditional Left 
while re-defining secularism is to be counted as a meaningful progress. (See the 
political advertisement in Appendix 2.) The party also displayed this attitude 
upon entering the elections. Backing Fethullah Gülen, who was severely 
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criticized during the 28th February period, and his schools while nominating the 
ones who had close links with that section in the lists, can be depicted as Ecevit’s 
and his party’s moderate movements surpassing the dichotomy of religion and 
secularism. Ecevit’s manner of not offending the conservative sections of the 
public enhanced the party’s power. Most probably for the fist time in the history 
of Turkish Republic, a religious brotherhood supported a leftist party. 
In his campaign platform, Ecevit made a limited number of promises that 
he could fulfill, instead of promising many things to the Turkish people. Ecevit 
depicted his party’s achievements, the most crucial one was to decrease the 
inflation rate below %50, in economy in the 56th government as an answer to the 
critiques on the DLP’s lack of economic credentials. In this respect almost half 
of the campaign platform dealt with financial issues. It was clearly told in the 
election pamphlet that the party is a supporter of  privatization. It is accentuated  
that: “It would be for the benefit of the country to privatize all public economic 
enterprises  (Kamu İktisadi Teşebbüsleri, KIT) except the ones which are 
strategically crucial for the country. Since, this policy will serve the economy 
with respect to get the most efficient result from  productive economic assets.”99 
The DLP made this defense of privatization in terms of its own philosophy. It 
differs from the center-right (especially the TPP) party’s inclination of taking 
privatization as merely a source of income. In this context, the aim of 
privatization is expressed in this way: “Privatization will be made in order to get 
the highest output for the country’s economy from the production facilities, to 
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guarantee the revitalization of the technology and to provide the property in the 
grassroots.”100  
 The third important discourse of the DLP was on the foreign policy area. 
It declared that it will shift the route of  foreign policy to a different area than the 
western-oriented one. The DLP underlined that it would follow a “region centric 
national foreign policy” when they get the power. Turkey’s chance of 
revitalizing this foreign policy focused on regional factors after the end of the 
cold war and the demise of the Soviet Union in the1990s. The DLP had 
anticipated the collapse of the Soviet Bloc and had offered to send deputies to 
that of autonomous Turkic countries and establish close links with them in its 
election manifesto of 1987. However, the party was criticized to be 
‘nationalistic’ by the leftists at that time. 
  As it was put forward, the DLP asserted that it would end Western-the 
U.S. centered foreign policy and would follow an ‘independent’ foreign policy. 
In this line of thought, the countries that are in the region gained importance for 
the DLP. These are the countries that are situated in the Balkans, the Middle East 
and  Central Asia. To enhance the relationship especially with the Central Asian 
countries without displaying a ‘chauvinist’ mood was also supported101. The 
difference between the ‘nationalism’ of the NAP and of the DLP is that, the latter 
takes it as its duty to deal with the Turkic societies as Turkey had historic and 
cultural ties with them. This policy was to be applied within the borders of 
international law.  However, the former based nationalism on imperialistic 
tendencies. In order to underpin these claims, the DLP gave evidences from their 
achievements during their tenure in the minority government  
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These achievements were the result of the adopted goals and principles: 
- The initial goal of the Turkish foreign policy was to provide the security and 
honor of Turkey. 
- The second goal and function of foreign policy was to assist in the 
improvement of the economy. 
- The third was to empower the appearance of Turkey on the world scene. 
It was added in the platform that, in order to attain these goals and to realize 
these functions, the required strategy had been established,  policies formed and 
all of these had been supported by special operation plans. It has been 
determined that European Union is a goal but it cannot be an ‘obsession’. 
A legal arrangement should also be made to open the way for the political 
freedoms according to the DLP. This requires a new constitution that would be 
purified from the ideologies in order to broaden the area of political rights. As it 
is stated: “The new constitution should not delve into detail, but rather be 
substantial. It should not enforce a certain ideology. It should ensure; the genuine 
and participatory democracy, state of law, national and territorial unity, a secular 
order that is respectful of beliefs, and human rights and freedoms.”102 This 
suggested constitution was depicted as compulsory to reach an impartial state, 
which Turkish society was in need of.  
 On the southeastern issue, the DLP defined the solution as “land reform”. 
Since the problem was not a “Kurdish question” for them, rather is an end result 
of  “economic and feudal” problems. As it was told under the title of “What is 
national Unity For DLP?”  
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-   ‘Turk’ does not refer to a single race, ethnicity, region or religion. It is a term 
that unites all of these.  
- The problem in the southeast does not stem from the disputes between the 
Turks and the Kurds. In fact, there does not exist such a problem. It is an 
outcome of the state’s wrong policies in the region. (e.g. unemployment, 
poverty) 
- DLP offers programs that are for the improvement of the region in the areas 
of education and unemployment. 
- The capture of Abdullah Öcalan is an outcome of cohesion among the state 
mechanisms during the minority government. 
In the context of providing economic improvement, Ecevit prepared an 
economic revival package for the poverty-stricken east and southeast and 
announced it on 11 April 1999. The modest, $108 million plan aimed to create 
8.200 jobs in the following years. The program offered that the factories would 
be offered subsidized electricity, with discounts of 50 percent in the first year of 
operations. In addition, the development plan contained investments in 
infrastructure, energy, education and health in economically backward regions. 
However, this program was found inadequate and even prosaic by some 
economists and even seen as a pre-election generosity rather than a 
comprehensive regional development program.103  
 The vast lands of the Aga’s  (landowners) would be equally shared among 
the residents of the region as offered in the campaign platform. However, the 
DLP seemed to take the problem from a romantic angle, since the landowners 
were not powerful as they were when Turkish economy was more bound to 
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agriculture, as Çaha asserts. The main problem is rather that the state allocated 
great sources of income that are collected from the other part of the society to 
these landowners.  
In the democratization chapter of the election platform, the DLP mainly 
targeted participatory democracy. The cooperation of the DLP with the non-
governmental organizations including labor unions and businessmen’s 
associations when they were in power were depicted as evidences of their 
sincerity on the issues of democratization. In the same context, to decrease the 
age at which a deputy candidacy from 30 to 25 was among  DLP’s plans. The 
argument of the DLP in this plan was that approximately 60 percent of Turkey’s 
population is younger than 25 and letting younger deputies in the parliament 
would contribute to the democratization of the country. The DLP also supported 
the establishment of university student councils as part of its democratization 
program. To change the structure of the State Security Courts (DGM) was 
promised in the platform as well. 
The DLP’s campaign platform encouraged women to become more active in 
the country’s administration. When Ecevit publicized the DLP’s party platform 
he asserted that there were laws regarding the status of women, but they are not 
well implemented. Citing lack of education and lack of independence as the main 
obstacles in front of Turkish women, Ecevit said that his party had prepared 
plans to educate women. “The DLP has 1,525 female candidates who will run in 
the April 18 local elections,” he said.104 
 In short, the DLP portrayed an image of a ‘rightist-left’ party rather than 
a leftist party image, before the elections. While it stood close to the center-right 
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parties in terms of economy, in political terms it was closer to the nationalist-
conservative parties. 
 
DLP’s wind of change 
What was behind this wind? The initial factor was without doubt the 
capture of Öcalan. Secondly, the left-wing parties assumed power by offering 
hope and change in France, Britain and England. Ecevit’s rise was also related to 
the wind of the left in the Europe. The only difference with the left-wing political 
parties in Europe and Ecevit is that Ecevit lacks the popularity of the great 
masses in Turkey. 
 Thirdly, Ecevit had great importance. The DLP was in a way the 
extension of the cult of Ecevit. Great masses of people were convinced that 
Ecevit played a prominent role in the capture of Öcalan, and believed that he was  
an honest statesman with strong principles. 
 Other parties’ not initiating plausible policies also allowed the DLP to 
assume an advantageous position. Bülent Ecevit and his party became a ‘hope’, 
as opposed to the other parties’ billboard advertisements, meaningless posters, 
and their tired slogans. 
The positive sides of Ecevit were his statesmanship, his calm attitude, his 
refrain from deceitful games, his honesty and separating himself from the bigots 
with his respect towards the secularist concepts. (see the political ad. in 
Appendix 3)  
 With regard to the organizational structure of the DLP, Fehmi Koru 
asserts that: “The DLP has adopted an organizational structure that is strong at 
the headquarters and relatively weak at the regional administrations.” He adds 
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that it would be difficult to make great advances all over Turkey with such an 
organizational level.105 
 
Republican People’s Party 
The RPP takes place at the center-left part of the political spectrum.  It 
prepared bulletins explaining its goals in the local and country executives, 
instead of preparing complex election pamphlets. It offered a crucial reform in 
the municipalities under the rubric of  “Local Solution 2000”. According to this 
slogan, some services in the areas of, culture and arts, environment, tourism, city 
traffic, sports activities, and several health and education services would be 
shifted to the municipalities. The central executive would only control the 
municipalities with “The Ministry of Local Administrations”. In this context, the 
RPP gave the message that the participation would be increased in the city 
administrations. Thus, it will not be an exaggeration to say that RPP’s radical 
views on the local executives were the mere and major issue that came to the 
fore in the 18 April 1999 elections. 
 Although the RPP had renovated its party program in 1993 after 17 years 
since 1976, it could not display much difference except for one or two renewals. 
The RPP had taken its basis from the ‘official ideology’. The party has 
advocated the six arrows106 as the basis of the Turkish state. However, etatism, 
populism, nationalism and revolutionism have become debatable items among 
                                                          
105 Fehmi Koru, “The Irony of Fate: 25 Years on, Ecevit is the hope again”, 5 March 1999, TDN 
106 The six arrows are described by Ayse Kadıoğlu  as; Populism (Halkçılık): Politics has to be 
made according to the wishes of the people, Republicanism (cumhuriyetçilik): Turkey is a 
republic according to western understanding, Etatism (devletçilik): Economy is state controlled, 
Secularism (laiklik): Strict separation between state and religion, Nationalism (milliyetçilik): 
There is only one indivisible Turkish nation,  Revolutionism/Reformism (inkılapçılık): Go for a 
permanent progress in society, in ‘The Paradox of Turkish nationalism and the construction of 
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those six arrows in today’s Turkey. The RPP has accepted them without 
searching their extent of compatibility with democracy. However, the RPP took a 
more moderate secularism that consolidates peace in society and established 
mutual tolerance. 
 The RPP signaled that it welcomes privatization. While it insisted on the 
rehabilitation of the public economic corporations, it shifted in a timid manner 
toward privatization. There should not have been made any concession in public 
economic entrepreneurship, but privatization has to be made for higher quality 
and productivity. The RPP seemed to appear as lacking the requirements of the 
new millenium and its ideological preferences. 
  
Center-Right Parties 
 
Motherland Party 
 MP, one of the two center-right parties shares almost exactly the same 
ideologies as the TPP. It is western oriented and favors liberal economic policies 
such as privatization and tax reform. MP was forced from power after allegations 
that its leader, Mesut Yılmaz had been involved in corruption and had Mafia 
connections. The last corruption case revealed in the privatization of the state-
owned bank, Türkbank, led the RPP to withdraw its support from the coalition 
and joined the VP and the TPP and in submitting no-confidence motions against 
the government.107  
                                                                                                                                                            
Official Identity’, in Slyvia Kedourie (ed.) Turkey: Identity, Democracy, Politics  
(London:Portland: Frank Cass, 1998), p, 177 
107 “1999 Turkish Elections: Background and Outlook” by Harlan Kohen, a research assistant at 
The Washington Institute. 
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The MP had pioneered lifting the borders between state and society during 
Turgut Özal’s tenure. He withdrew the curtains on both the public and political 
sphere. With the help of this policy, the bribery, corruption, and incompetence in 
the state sector were reveled to the public.  Sections of the public that had been 
seen as a threat beforehand began to come out of hiding in both the public and 
political sphere and also in the public sphere as Islamic and Kurdish identities. 
However the state elite was the most effected section from these improvements. 
Yılmaz’s succeeding  the leadership of the MP meant to put the country under 
the hegemony of the state elite once again. Accordingly, he followed an 
elimination process of the opposition leaders and Özal’s team in the party.     
 Before entering the 1995 elections, Yılmaz had become the oneman as he 
eliminated all of his challengers in the party. Bickering about Tansu Çiller was 
the only thing he did during the elections. After the elections Yılmaz 
acknowledged that their target would shift to the DLP-centered left electorates. 
 He pursued an election campaign carrying leftist tendencies as he had 
already turned his back to the conservative segments. Yılmaz had criticized the 
other politicians as they always made commitments during the election 
campaigns. However, Yılmaz turned out to be one of the most committed in the 
18 April election campaigns. Turkey’s electorate had lost confidence in the 
politicians due to unfulfilled promises. As an experienced politician Yılmaz 
should have been aware of this fact. Being the one who had surpassed all the 
other’s promises, Yılmaz ignored the sensitivities of the Turkish electorate.   
The MP had issued a manifesto entitled “ The Turkey Contract” in that it 
pledged that if it comes to power on its own, in five years, it would solve all of 
Turkey’s structural problems, wipe out inflation and start a period of major 
 74
leaps. This jargon reflected the leftist tendency of Yılmaz. In this line of thought 
,Yılmaz made promises about labor, housing, education, social security and 
health as the requirements of a social state. Yet, they differed radically from 
Özal’s discourse of privatization, freedom of thought, belief and enterprise. 
Among his exaggerated promises there were, unemployment insurance that 
would cover all the employees, inflation at the rate of 5%, health facilities that 
would double the existing ones and a house for each family...This “Turkey 
Contract” not only did not suit Turkey’s facts, but also consolidated the image of 
“politician who makes too many promises” in the electorates’ minds. 
 Thus, the MP that had gathered ‘four tendencies’ of the left, 
conservatism, nationalism and liberalism, had now absolved the party from three 
of them but left with ‘left’. MP, drifting towards the left is now a leftist-right 
party with both its discourse and performances.  
 
The True Path Party 
The True Path is Turkey’s other center-right party and like MP, it 
supports pro-Western, liberal policies. In June 1993, Çiller was elected the 
party’s leader and became Turkey’s first female prime minister after Süleyman 
Demirel stepped down to become president. In 1995, TPP ran on a strongly anti-
Islamist platform. Nonetheless, it was the TPP that entered into coalition with the 
Islamist WP in June 1996, leading to a number of members to defect from the 
party. 
 Çiller had adopted a new tactic for the 1999 elections. TPP actively 
pursued WP/VP’s electorate. Çiller had tried to recruit support from the religious 
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orders (tarikats) and had taken to wearing headscarves in public and on 
campaign pamphlets. 
TPP preserved its traditional line entering the polls. The program of 
“Second Democracy” displayed in the 1999 elections seemed to complement 
“less state, more society” concept of Çiller that she adopted when she was the 
Prime Minister. The legal reform motion took place in the “Second Democracy” 
program that would lead to the improvement in individual rights and freedoms, 
and would consolidate the participation of the public. The state should reduce its 
involvement in the economy and provide justice, security and defense of the 
country.  
 During the 18 April election process, it was observed that the center-right 
left its central discourse to a great extent. While one of the center-right leaders, 
Yılmaz converted his party’s route to the left, the other leader, Çiller, shifted to a 
nationalist-conservative discourse. Çiller was first in sending messages to the 
nationalist and conservative sections in the elections.  
 
Nationalist-Conservative Parties 
 
Virtue Party 
In December 1997, when it became clear that the armed forces might ban 
WP from politics, members of the movement created the VP. VP claimed to be a 
new party and not simply an extension of WP. In its election campaign, it had 
tried to redraw itself as a center-right party. Whereas Welfare had eschewed ties 
with the West, openly slandered Israel, and called for a Muslim oriented foreign 
policy, VP supported Turkey’s involvement in NATO and its European Union 
(EU) aspirations and toned down its anti-Israel rhetoric. The VP adopted an 
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economic policy resembling that of the Social Democrats in Britain and 
Germany, instead of WP’s “just order”. Despite these differences, secular 
sections of Turkish society were skeptical; believing the party still threatened the 
secular nature of the Turkish state. It was unlikely that the armed forces would 
allow it to be part of a ruling coalition. The party had a powerful grassroots 
organization capable of mobilizing its voters. Although VP’s internal divisions 
and potential to be banned could drive voters away, the party’s general success 
in governing municipalities has stood it in good stead. 
 The goals that the VP displayed in the election pamphlet and the ones that 
the WP formerly supported seemed to be exactly opposite. In its liberal context 
the VP asserted that the state should not deal with the productıon area rather 
should be in the position of checking and regulating. From this point of departure 
the VP stated that in an accelerated program all the public enterprises including 
the public banks would be privatized. 
 According the VP, unless a thought leads to violence it should not be 
taken as a crime. Thereupon,  they claimed that if they would be the government 
they would change the 312th article of the Turkish Criminal Code and article 8 of 
the Terrorism Law both of which restrict freedom of thought. This party defined 
secularism as placing freedom of thought at its center. As it was indicated in the 
election manifesto they were against the tendency to perceive secularism as 
religion and  religion as an ideology. In fact when we make a comparison among 
the parties’ interpretation of secularism, it will not be difficult to acknowledge 
that they are basically  the same , at least on paper. 
   The VP’s view on foreign policy also differed from that of the WP. There 
is no mention to the “Common Market of Islamic Countries”, rather the VP 
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favored a region centric foreign policy similar to that of the DLP. It also 
supported Turkey’s completing the candidacy process to the EU. It could be 
claimed that as a successor to the WP, the VP managed to draw its plan taking 
into consideration the political and economic trends in the world as opposed to 
its predecessor.  
 
Nationalist Action Party 
 The NAP sent shock waves by nearly doubling its number of votes. In 
fact, the party had been following a deep and intense strategy for the elections. 
They made several investigations on many problems of Turkey such as 
unemployment, inflation, environmental problems, and published them in the 
form of small pamphlets with the picture of Alparslan Türkeş108 on their 
coverage. In fact, their devotion to the immortal leader motivated the party 
members to be the government. As analyzed above, while the other parties take 
the state as a servant of the public, the NAP, on the contrary, takes it as a 
sublime authority that surrounds society. 
 On the secularism issue they claimed, “An order of state would be secular 
and democratic as long as it involves freedom of religion and conscience. 
Secularism would be meaningful when it ensures the fraternity of the people 
without ignoring their beliefs.” The NAP that asserted its interpretation of 
secularism in this way, promised that they would solve the headscarf problem in 
the universities, in the parliament, and accused the WP as it was not “brave” 
enough to solve the issue. 
                                                          
108 He is the founder of the Nationalist Action Party 
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 In the foreign policy area, the NAP embraced the challenging slogan 
“leader Turkey” that of Erbakan’s in the 1970s. Making Turkey the center, 
“East-Mediterranean Union” would be established with countries such as Jordan, 
Egypt, Israel and Palestinen. With the help of this national foreign policy, 
Turkey would provide social and cultural cooperation both with the Islamic 
countries and the countries that have traditional ties with Turkey. 
 The NAP avoided especially making any reference to nationalism and the 
southeastern problem. It tried to prevent itself from to be presented at the 
opposite side of the PKK. It is interesting that none of the pamphlets prepared for 
the election campaign covered these issues either. 
 The emergence of the NAP as the second party in the 18 April was not by 
chance. The party managed to portray a vision as the result of a workshop with  
many academicians. As an academician himself, Bahçeli nominated the 
academicians instead of alayli 109 ones from the party lists. With the help of this 
transformation in the party image, Bahceli underlined that the NAP situated itself 
at the center of the political spectrum. 
 
On The General Atmosphere of the Election Campaigns 
 
As Alan Makovksy examined, the campaign was a dull one. Some 
candidates had taken challenging stands, Yılmaz on Greece and Kurdish related 
issues, Çiller on headscarves and religion, but these did not prove serious debate 
among the candidates. Lack of public excitement, apparent in the relatively small 
crowds at candidate rallies, reflected a variety of factors: public cynicism 
generated by too many broken campaign promises over the years; public doubts 
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about the integrity and competence of several of the party leaders; and the 
perception that elected governments have diminishing impact on important 
issues, with the military, the judiciary, and other un-elected officials emerging as 
the real driving forces in the secularism-islamism debate. 110 
As opposed to the criticism made on the lack of ‘excitement’ during the 
election campaign, Cengiz Çandar asked “Why should we need excitement?” 
and he responded: “In a country in which over 60% of the population is not older 
than 29 years old, the president is 75 years old. The Prime Minister is nearly 75, 
and his party is expected to emerge from the election as either the first party or 
the runner-up with a small margin. The VP leader is over 70...” Çandar added 
that the lack of excitement was indeed a healthy sign. Since the people were 
aware of the fact that the resulting elections would not solve the problems of the 
country.111 
  The Supreme Electoral Board (YSK) forbade the media to publish 
the results of public opinion polls, and even the political consulting companies 
were not permitted to conduct such polls before the 18 April elections. After 
indicating the importance of the public opinion polls as they facilitate the flow of 
information between political leaders and their hard-core constituencies, and 
keep the lines of communication between the state and its citizen open, Erhan 
Göksel112 evaluated the pre-election period. He stated that the campaign period 
was the worst in the professionally conducted political campaigns. He pointed 
out two main reasons for that poor going of the campaigns: 
                                                                                                                                                            
109 The ones that learn politcs in the party organizations. 
110 Alan Makovsky, “Special Policy Forum Report, Turkey on the Election Eve”,  Sülay Özturk 
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111  15 April 1999, Sabah 
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First of all society is de-politicized, and they are remote from politics 
during this election campaign.  People are not interested in general 
politics; their priority are the local polls. The reason for this is that when 
you elect a mayor, he remains in his post for five years, regardless of 
whether he is good or bad...The second reason is that there are no longer 
any leaders in Turkish politics... 
 
According to him, Ecevit could be depicted as a leader, but the others were only 
the chairmen of their parties. 
 On the election campaigns of the parties Göksel made crucial evaluations 
from the view of a specialist of election campaigns. He commented on the DLP 
as follows: “There is only one party in Turkey that is not disseminating 
propaganda for the upcoming elections. But not conducting campaign is the 
biggest campaign ever. The DLP is advocating that its impartiality is to its 
advantage. But being impartial is the biggest partiality.” 
Supporting evidence to Göksel’s claim can be seen on billboard 
advertisements of   political parties. In the March 5th 1999 issue of daily Radikal, 
the number of the paid for billboards by the parties in Istanbul in February were:  
TPP 1260, MP 1000, RPP 600 and VP 237. It was striking that in a city, which 
has a great significance with its 69 MPs, the DLP involved in the ‘war of 
billboards’ at least until the February of 1999. 
 Emphasizing the media’s influence over people’s political choices, 
Göksel asserted that the television is the most important tool of political 
campaign and Ecevit’s appearance on TV while he continued with his daily 
routine was the greatest propaganda.  
 When we look at the VP’s election campaign, it was based on one-to-one 
relations. Its short, but successful slogan was, “We will govern Turkey with 
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Göksel, the owner of the Verso Political Research Center, by Esra Erduran, 4 April 1999, Turkish 
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you.” The VP’s mayoral candidate for Greater Istanbul Municipality used the 
words of people on the street in his campaign. “We have to accept that Greater 
Istanbul Municipality has worked well so far,” was a very common idea shared 
by millions of Istanbul residents and using it was a very clever idea, according to 
Göksel. 
 The MP and the TPP suffered from bad slogans. MP’s slogan of “the 
silent majority” was not a Turkish concept, as Göksel indicated. Since, with the 
silent majority concept, Yılmaz meant the middle class of the country. However 
in Turkey the middle class was not silent. There were people who roared in the 
bus lines, who staged protests in the streets for higher salaries, and for their 
rights. Göksel re-asserts that the ‘silent-majority’ was translated from English to 
Turkish. And similar to other imported ideas for carrying out election campaigns, 
it failed to attract the attention of the Turkish people.  
 And about the Republican People’s Party, Göksel underlined that the RPP 
had a confusing campaign policy. They made huge mistakes. They had used 
posters saying,  “Do not vote. Make your decision.” Votes are the only way that 
makes people to check the political system. Besides, voting is the only way for 
being a part of the state mechanism, and they can only do it once every five 
years. 
 As Göksel also asserted, the DLP did nothing special or extraordinary in 
its election campaign. The general de-politicized atmosphere of the country, lack 
of excitement about the general elections and other parties’ previous corruption 
worked to the advantage of the Democratic Left Party. The media also played a 
crucial role in shaping the outcome of the 1999 elections. Thus, an analysis of 
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the media’s posture entering the polls would enlighten us on the impact of the 
media in the rise of the DLP. 
 
The Media and 18 April Elections  
 On the eve of the elections, the political atmosphere of the country was 
imbued with two main subjects; the first one was the precautions taken under the 
guidance of 28th February process against the “danger of fundamentalism” and 
the second was the improvements in hindering the separatists as a result of the 
capture of Abdullah Öcalan on 4 December 1998.113 Economic and political 
unstability stood as the most urgent problems for which people searched a 
powerful government to solve. This hope was formulated as  “the government 
that would carry the country to the 2000s” among the people. By the way, the 
media and several business circles approved a coalition between the MP and the 
DLP, as they found them as a well-proposed partners that worked successfully in 
the MP-DLP-DTP coalition government.114 
The daily Hürriyet  drew a partial line in most of the cases. When the VP 
took the leading position of the mavericks (the MPs who were not enlisted as 
candidates and wanted to postpone the elections) and demanded the abolition of 
the 312th article of Turkish Penal Code, Hürriyet carried the words of Hüseyin 
Kıvrıkoğlu, The Chief of the General Staff, to the headlines, as: “The army is 
against the abolition of the 312th article as it is the only underpinning in the 
struggle with terror and fundamentalism. The delay in elections can cause chaos 
                                                          
113 The Media and the Elections in Turkey (Ankara: Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 1999 ) 
114 In this respect, an interview was published on 14 April 1999 issue of Sabah, made with Sakıp 
Sabancı and Rahmi Koç by Ruhat Mengi. In that interview both of the businessmen declared that 
they were expecting a MP-DLP government. 
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in the country.” His views which were interpreted as “expected and proper 
declaration” in the newspapers which belonged to the Doğan media group. 
 Another crucial event in the pre-election period was Nuh Mete Yüksel’s 
initiation of an investigation on the VP, due to the claims that performance of the 
VP displayed in postponing the elections was carried out under the guidance of 
Necmettin Erbakan.  
 Despite the prohibition of the YSK (Supreme Election Board) of 
broadcasts that were partial and would effect the decision of a voter, it has been 
examined that some broadcasts that were partial and effective on the vote of the 
electorate were nevertheless presented in several TV channels. These programs 
were seemingly not covering the elections, but they presented a biased attitude in 
a disguised way. For instance, the program called Arena broadcasted on Channel 
D, on 23 March 1999, displayed an anti-VP discourse by carrying the “Milli 
Görüş Dosyası”115 into the agenda. The allegation was initiated by the prosecutor 
of the State Security Court with the demand of execution of Erbakan and his 32 
deputies. Some cassettes concerning the speeches of Hasan Hüseyin Ceylan, 
Şevki Yılmaz and Yasin Hatipoglu were announced in the program. In the 
similar context, the results of the research made by TESEV116 that were mostly 
related with religious tendencies of the people, were published under different 
titles in different newspapers. For instance, while the daily Akit presented it as 
“Our people are leaning to Islam” (3.4.1999), Hürriyet used the title “Our 
Muslims are not in the favor of Sharia.”  (10.4.1999) 
 Finally, the newspapers published the public opinion polls with their 
biased interpretations one day before the elections. Milliyet’s commentary on the 
                                                          
115 The file of National Outlook 
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opinion polls was “The left (DLP, RPP) is rising, their votes has reached 35% for 
the first time (16 April 1999). Cumhuriyet also announced that the RPP was 
challenging in three cities and the socialist votes were increasing under the title 
of “the left is coming” (17 April 1999) 
 So, although the Turkish media did not display a vivid performance in 
terms of presenting the election campaigns and discussion programs compared to 
the previous elections, they adopted a biased and partial broadcasting tendency 
that would affect the people during the election campaigns. 
 
The Reflections of Ecevit’s Election campaign on the Media 
 
 
 Although Ecevit held relatively less meetings in number compared to the 
other parties, certain groups of media highlighted these meetings in order to 
create a powerful image of the DLP. For instance, the meeting held in 
Kastamonu, presented in a praising tone in April 15th issue of daily Hürriyet as: 
“A ten thousand person meeting under the heavy rain in Kastamonu”. The news 
continued with Ecevit’s own words; “This crowd is the greatest gift that I 
received in my life. The ballot boxes will not be enough to cover all of the DLP’s 
votes, as it can be anticipated from this crowd that cannot be limited with the 
borders of this square.” He resumed his speech along with the slogans of the 
“Populist Ecevit” and the “Conqueror of Cyprus”. Ecevit underlined the DLP’s 
difference as it’s managing to stay clean when it came to power. He also claimed 
that the most powerful and successful political staff belonged to the DLP. “After 
the DLP’s coming to power the state re-gained its power and started to cooperate 
in great harmony and the capture of Öcalan is a result of this work,” stated 
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Ecevit. On the road, Ecevit prohibited smoking both for himself and the 
journalists that can be depicted as one of the characteristics of Ecevit. 117 
 “The pigeon rises” was the title used in Sabah 3 days before the elections. 
Sabah used a very contented tone of wordings while portraying the DLP as the 
first party in the country.  For instance, DLP’s rise in the regions was reported as 
“the wind of DLP encompasses the country from Aegean to Mediterranean, from 
Blacksea to Inner Anatolia.” 118 
Ecevit described Çiller as “The one with whom nobody can compete on 
leading the banks to bankruptcy” and accused Deniz Baykal of inheriting the 
fortune of the RPP. He wanted votes from the crowd as a response to his 
successes during his tenure and also requested not to divide the votes with a 
sense of pity implying the RPP’s probability of failing to pass the 10 percent 
threshold. He repeated his request of the people not to support the RPP in 
Akhisar as well, emphasizing the point that the new government should not be 
fragmented, in his speech in Bursa. 119 Ecevit followed mostly negative 
campaigning120 in regard to the RPP. In his Bursa meeting, Ecevit accused Deniz 
Baykal of escaping from taking responsibility in the hardest times of the country. 
He added that, “They considered that we would not manage to overcome the 
economic crisis. However, we not only overcome the crises but also became 
stronger. It is very normal for them to fear as $24 billion debt should be 
paid...”121 
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In his Sivas meeting, Ecevit emphasized that the state regained its 
identity during the tenure of the DLP and he drew attention on some 
achievements of the state: the perpetrators of the fire in Mavi Çarsi,  that resulted 
in the death of 13 people were arrested immediately. The terrorist that arranged 
the bomb attack on the governor of Cankırı was also captured. Ecevit claimed 
that the quickness in resolving such problems is due to the harmony among the 
state mechanisms that was damaged previously. Turkey regained its image of 
being a strong state, not only in internal matters, but also in the foreign affairs. 
For instance, Turkey hindered the entrance of the S-300 missiles into South-
Cyprus and managed to disclose that Greece trained terrorists that came from 
Turkey. Ecevit added, referring to EU’s rejection of Turkey’s candidature at 
Luxembourg in December 1997 that, “Turkey is a strong country and is able to 
open new doors to itself. So, the EU’s closing its doors to us is not important.”122 
Although Ecevit was the politician who made relatively less promises 
during the election campaigns, he could not refrain from promising the 
abolishment of university entrance exams in two years time, in his meeting in 
Sivas. Some of the DLP candidates also engaged making promises to garner 
votes. For instance, Denizli candidate, İlker İhan, proclaimed that the busses of 
the municipality and water to 8 tons would be free if he would be mayor.123  
Yavuz Donat asked Ecevit, “Mr.Ecevit you garnered votes in 1970s with 
the slogan of ‘I will change the system’, but now you are promising preserving 
the system.”  Ecevit replied, “Yes it is true, but today that jargon has a different 
meaning and that belongs to the VP. However, the people are against such a 
discourse.”  According to Yavuz Donat, Ecevit was the most relaxed and joyful 
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politician as he was further from scandals during the pre-election period. 
Moreover, the others’ faults and the conjuncture worked for his benefit, as Donat 
indicated. 124 
 Nazli Ilıcak from Yeni Safak criticized this solidarity between Ecevit and 
certain media groups in her article entitled “The balloon of Ecevit”. Although her 
anticipation on the explosion of this balloon did not came true, things she 
pointed out were valid to some extent. According to her, there were lots of 
questions to be answered, but they could not be asked since both Ecevit and 
Yılmaz paid attention not to appear on TV or other platforms. The questions to 
be asked would be: the corruption in Türkbank bids, the malpractice in providing 
land to Koç University, corruption in the Municipality of Şişli (a town of 
Istanbul), the cruelty applied to girls wearing headscarves and the elimination 
system that makes it more difficult for entrance of the graduate of the Imam 
Hatip Schools’ to university. Ilicak did not agree with the achievements of Ecevit 
despite the praise in other newspapers. According to her, Abdullah Öcalan was 
captured with the cooperation of America and Israel. Moreover, even our 
consolations on bringing Öcalan from Kenya turned out to be wrong. Since we 
just brought him from Israel as a packet prepared by Mossad agents, as 
Frankfurter Allgemiene Zeitung wrote. In her line of thought, the ‘silence’ of 
Ecevit on this issue was due to concealing these facts.125 
 Related to the “wind of DLP”: Cengiz Çandar conceded that the capture 
of Öcalan was the accelerating factor behind the wind. However, Çandar drew 
attention to the concession made in response to America’s presenting Öcalan as a 
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gift to Turkey. Ecevit did not make any comment on America’s obtaining the 
right to a free move in using İncirlik airport in order to bomb Iraq. According to 
Çandar, Ecevit had been too sensitive previously on letting the U.S. take off 
from İncirlik and bomb one of our neighbors.  So, he criticized the ones who see 
only the wind of Ecevit but do not ask any questions on the upcoming storm due 
to the concessions given.  126 
Yılmaz also worked for the benefit of the DLP during the election 
campaigns with the hope of making a coalition with Ecevit after the elections. In 
his address to people in İzmir, he demanded to unite center-right in the MP 
adding that the center-left was uniting in the DLP. 127 
 Tuncay Özkan was also among the ones who implicitly criticized the 
minority government of Ecevit in his article. Özkan asserted that the state 
claimed that it was struggling with the gangs however, neither the people were 
informed on this struggle nor the way that was used in this fight was publicized. 
On the Susurluk scandal, he asserted that,   “Moreover the dis-information policy 
is adopted in Susurluk scandal. Nobody knows the outcome of the trials on 
Susurluk event.” How would the electorate make the right choice without 
knowing the real problems of the country, asked Tucay Özkan in his column.128 
 It was striking that a leader of a certain religious section of the society 
declared their overt support for the DLP. It would have been a disaster for the 
VP, if a religious order had declared their support in such a way. However, there 
occured no problem when Radikal announced the declaration of the General 
Directorate of Cem Foundation, Prof. Dr. İzzettin Dogan. In the news it was 
                                                          
126 Cengiz Çandar, 29 July 1999, Sabah 
127 17 April 1999, Radikal 
128 15 April 1999, Radikal 
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written that, he and his friends would vote for the DLP as it was the only party 
that formulated solutions on the dichotomy between the Alewites and Sunnis and 
that also would make the necessary legal arrangements in this subject. He added 
that the Alewites had been voting for the RPP for 30 years, but the RPP did not 
serve them129 (The open demand of votes from the Alewites can be seen in the 
political ad. in Appendix 4) 
 Mesut Yılmaz tried to make soft criticisms on the DLP while he severely 
criticized the others during the election campaigns. He labeled the leaders of the 
other parties as ‘separatists’ since according to Yılmaz, the RPP is to exploit 
Atatürk, the VP religion and the TPP everything. But he never touched on the 
DLP. 130 
 “The rich say DLP” asserted Can Ataklı in his column. He concluded 
from the conservation with many rich people that they would vote for Ecevit. 
Most of them were the ones that tried toppling down Ecevit by subsidizing 
advertisements in newspapers 20 years ago. The other interesting point was that 
those businessmen were aware of the fact that the economy would worsen in 
case of Ecevit’s success. But, their explanation was the same with the answer of 
the ordinary people: the corruption in the MP and the TPP.131  
Ataklı satirized the discourse on Ecevit as “the most democratic leader” 
in his article, after acknowledging that the DLP is governed by ‘sultanship’ 
instead of democracy. In this context, Ataklı indicated that while the other 
parties held pre-elections and worked in close coordination with their 
                                                          
129  12 April 1999, Radikal 
130 13 April 1999, Radikal 
131 Can Ataklı, 11 April 1999, Sabah 
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organizations in nominating the candidates, the DLP resolved the nomination by 
‘one selector’. 132 
In most of Ecevit’s speeches the common and major emphasis was made 
on the successful achievements of the DLP in the minority government. Ecevit 
was very confident of the outcome of the elections. As he stated in his speeches 
that in the 1995 elections, the DLP became the first party of the left, and in the 
coming elections they were going to be the first party of Turkey.  
Therefore, from the above, the DLP’s election platform and its reflections 
on the media entering the elections, one can conclude that the rise of the DLP in 
the 1999 elections stems not only from its election campaign, but also to a  
higher degree from the conjuncture of the country. People widely agreed on a 
search for an honest, uncorrupted and conciliatory leader against corrupt 
politicians. The capture of Abdullah Öcalan and Ecevit’s taking place on the  TV 
screens due to his post were the most crucial factors that backed the ‘wind of 
Ecevit’. 
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 91
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
 92
 
 
 
 
As widely predicted, the DLP raised its votes from 14.6 percent in the 
1995 elections to more than 22 percent and captured 135 seats, compared to 76 
in 1995. By projecting the image of a leader in charge and confident of success, 
Ecevit who had personally created and developed the DLP during the past 
decade, was able to convert the widespread goodwill and media support into 
votes. (see Appendix 5)133 
 The point that should also be emphasized is that a leftist party had 
become first in the sequence for the first time since 1983 elections.  Not only did 
the pulling force of the DLP but also the pushing force of the other parties on the 
electorates led the votes transfer to the DLP. The indecisive manner of the fomer 
supporters of the TPP and MP and their probable shift  were anticipated in the 
opinion polls that were published before the elections despite the YSK’s ban ,as 
well. However it would be an oversimplification to explain the rise of the DLP 
just with the shift of the votes from the other parties. 
 Initially, the political conjuncture played a critical role in the rise of  
DLP. In the opinion polls made in August 1998, the DLP’s votes were floating 
around 11% and MP’s votes were around 18%. The role that the DLP played in 
realizing the 28th February decisions with the MP attracted the etatist circles. 
This was also consolidated with the support of the media. As the DLP had come 
to power by getting support of the two center parties, the important part of the 
discontented constituencies of the MP and the TPP transferred their votes to the 
                                                          
133 The charts that are referred in this chapter are from , Erol Tuncer , Seçim ’99: 18 Nisan 1999 
Milletvekili Genel Seçimleri: Sayısal ve Siyasal Değerlendirme, (Ankara:TESAV, 1999). 
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DLP. Thus, the DLP tuned out to be the ‘confident address’ for the undecided 
electorate. The shift of the electorate was also as a result of the 28th February 
process. Since, the center-right and left sections became wavered and uneasy due 
to the tense atmosphere of that process and they began to look for another 
alternative. So, they inclined toward the DLP as it portrayed the strong and stable 
party image that  also took the support of the state. 
 Secondly, the DLP was in a condition of a party that was identified with 
its leader who portrayed an image of the honest politician. His moderate life 
style, his environment away from stain and his modest property were credits 
among the corrupted political atmosphere of the country. Hence, Ecevit reaped 
electoral benefits from his image as an honest and uncorruptible leader. 
 Thirdly, the DLP adopted a discourse of “nationalist left” for a long time. 
Despite the RPP, it has been displaying a respectful manner towards the national 
and religious values of the people. In the process of the election campaigns, he 
especially paid attention not to disturb the conservative segments. Not only did 
the DLP give soft messages to the conservatives, but also depicted that it 
expected their votes by enlisting some conservative candidates. Such policies led 
the ones who were members of several brotherhoods and previously supported 
either the MP or the TPP, to the DLP in the elections. 
If we take a closer look to the election results setting the DLP to the 
center, the factors that led the party rise can be better understood. As it is also 
mentioned in the second chapter, the DLP lacks most of the features that a 
political party should carry. First of all, it does not have a strong party 
organization. It has limited numbers of members and as these members do not 
have great enthusiasm for making propaganda for the party, the number of the 
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younger constituencies stays limited. Despite its weak organizations DLP 
managed to attrack the electorate’s attention. However,  inclinations toward the 
DLP carry some discrepancies. Since when we look at the cities and regions 
from which the DLP garnered votes, it would be examined that, the DLP’ rise 
belonged merely to certain sections of the country. In fact, the general outcome 
of the elections is towards regionalism as it is seen Apendıx 8. The DLP had 
become first in the Aegean 34.31%, Marmara 27.95%, Trakya 41.85%, Blacksea 
22.73% regions and in Istanbul 29.66%. On the other hand, while the NAP has 
won most of the votes from the Central 27.00% and Western Anatolia 23.65, the 
PDP succeeded in South-Eastern Anatolia 18.20% and the VP in Eastern 
Anatolia 19.00%. 
The DLP is powerful in the developed regions and is weak in the under-
developed regions of the country as it is also seen in Appendix 6. (regional vote 
rates of DLP). The western part of Turkey is developed both in economic terms 
and in terms of the education level of the people. A similar leaning can also be 
noticed in the high education level of the nominees 82.0% of the DLP while the 
average is only 45.39% in the country average.  Moreover, the western regions 
are the richest parts of Turkey. The general discourse that a leftist party is the 
party of the poor and the labor is not compatible with the fact that the most 
prosperous and rich sections of the country voted for the DLP.  As it is seen in 
Appendix 7 that examines the vote rates according the Per capita income, while 
the rich voted for the DLP the poorest voted for the PDP. Here, it should also be 
acknowledged that Kurds’ voting for the PDP should not only be taken as ethnic 
votes but the votes that of the poorest people of the country. 
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Here, a retrospective analysis would be explanatory in understanding the 
rise of the DLP, as the result of the elections is also covered. Initially, it should 
be acknowledged that the general outcome of the 18 April elections was the ‘rise 
of nationalism’ overall in Turkey. This can be classified as, the rise of leftist 
nationalism (DLP) in the Western part of Turkey, rightist nationalism in  
Anatolia (NAP), and Kurdist nationalism (PDP) in the southeastern regions. As it 
is already mentioned in the first chapter, the capture of Abdullah Öcalan had 
great influence in the increase of the nationalist senses of the Turkish people.  
Ecevit paid special attention  not to use the capture of Öcalan as a tool to 
gain votes. However, this achievement had already put him in a privileged 
position as the capture was accomplished under his prime ministry. As it is 
written in the third chapter, there are some columnists that interpret the capture 
of Öcalan, as an event in which Turkey plays no role. In this respect, they find 
meaningless to praise Ecevit for the capture as they also claim that Turkey has 
made concessions in İncirlik in this respect. Nevertheless, it would be unjust not 
to give any credit to Ecevit in bringing Öcalan to Turkey. Since despite the fact 
that the process of the capture had started under the tenure of previous 
governments, neither Çiller nor Yılmaz managed to reach the final point. It was 
not because that they would deny to give some concessions to this end, rather it 
was their inability of preserving harmony among the organs of the state. That is 
the ‘statesmanship’ and ‘leadership’, which the formers lacked. Besides Ecevit’s 
carrying these qualities his ‘arbitrator’ character also let the state mechanisms 
work in accord. 
Moreover, the collapse in the state mechanism as it was revealed in the 
Susurluk scandal was very influential in fading out of the center-right votes. In 
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this sense, the capture of Öcalan has revitalized the image of ‘strong state’ in 
people’s minds. The lack of confidence to the state has been remedied under the 
tenure of Ecevit as prime minister. This rise in ‘national honor’ and the 
recapturing the trust of the people to the self-esteem Turkey that were lost in the 
previous governments played very critical role in the drifting of the center-right 
votes to the DLP. 
After referring to the conjectural factors that played intensive role in the 
blow of “the wind of the DLP”, it could be asked, “To what extent was the 
election campaign of the DLP influential in the outcome of the elections?” As it 
has previously mentioned in the third chapter, the DLP, in fact, did merely 
nothing for the sake of the election campaign. It can be both related with the 
general policy of the DLP that it adopted in the previous elections, and also be 
related with the de-politicized atmosphere of the country. Concerning the former 
factor, the DLP had never paid great importance to the election campaigns, as it 
lacks the strong organization to lead such campaigns. It also stems from the fact 
that the DLP prefers not to collect extra money from its members for the 
propaganda of the party, rather it uses the money that is allocated by the state for 
each party to be used in campaigning.  
In regard to the DLP’s election campaign, there was nothing different 
than the posters, flags and two election-busses used for the meetings made in 22 
cities.  The campaign was organized from the headquarters, they did not prefer to 
convey the campaign under the guidance of a professional organization. They 
also did not follow the strategy of the face- to- face campaigning, which was 
used by the WP in the 1995 elections and was very influential in garnering votes. 
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However, not conducting a campaign can be the biggest campaign as 
asserted by Erhan Göksel in the previous chapter. Not making any promises to a 
society tired of broken promises, and only highlighting its leader’s honesty, and 
his moderate, uncorrupted, untainted sides worked better for the benefit of the 
DLP.  
If the television is taken as the most consequential tool in affecting the 
voter behaviors, Ecevit was very advantageous in this respect. He was on screen 
every day, as he was the prime minister. As it is mentioned in the third chapter 
the written media also strengthened the DLP’s riding the waves of good fortune, 
depicting it as the only alternative against the rise of the VP and the strong 
defender of the Turkish Republic’s main tenets. 
Although I have covered so many issues, from the establishing period of 
the DLP to the pre-election period, it is still hard to find clear-cut answers to the 
rise of the DLP in the 18 April 1999 elections. This problem stems mostly from 
the paradoxes of the DLP per se. For instance, when we take the DLP’s rise as 
the rise of the leftist votes in the country, this explanation contradicts with the 
fact of the party’s lack of the crucial features that a leftist party should carry. I 
have mentioned these deficiencies in the first chapter as, the support of great 
masses, the strong rights of membership, strong organization...In this respect, 
when the outcome is linked to Ecevit’s great emphasis on preserving and 
elaborating democracy and in this regard people’s aspirations for the 
implementation of democracy in the country, this hypothesis would not work 
either. Since, the Turkish people could not be so naive in not noticin 
g the lack of intra-party democracy in the DLP. As I have put forward, 
while analyzing the political structure of the party that Ecevit is conveying an 
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autocratic policy leading the party, and the party has turned out to be the one that 
has the least rights of membership.    
Thus, it would be more convenient to connect the rise of the DLP to 
Turkish electorate’s tendency to punish the ones that displayed unsuccessful 
policies during their governance and to test the untried parties. When this line of 
interpretation is supported with the undeniable effects of the capture of Abdullah 
Öcalan that led to the rising tide of nationalism, the interpretation of the election 
results would fit better to Turkey’s facts. Since the rise of the NAP and the 
demise of the center-right parties (MP and TPP), can also be explained in the 
same manner. 
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